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Abstract
The literature on self-control problems has typically put forth models that imply
behavior that is consistent with the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference. We argue
that when choice is the outcome of some underlying internal conﬂict, the resulting
choices may not be perfectly consistent across choice problems: an agent’s ability
to resist temptation may well depend on what alternatives are available to him.
We generalize Gul and Pesendorfer [18] so that self-control weakens in the presence
of temptation. The foundations of the models require weakening the Independence
axiom. The model is shown to unify a range of well-known ﬁndings in the experimental
literature on choice under risk and over time.
1 Introduction
Gul and Pesendorfer [18] (henceforth GP) introduce a theory of choice under temptation.
They model an agent who, prior to the moment of choice, has a particular perspective
on what he “should” choose – refer to this as his commitment preference or normative
preference. However, he anticipates that he may behave diﬀerently at the moment of choice
because of his desires – refer to the latter as his temptation preference. Self-control is the
propensity to resist temptation and choose in accordance with the normative preference.
However, self-control is costly. In GP’s model, choice in some sense maximizes normative
preference net of self-control costs. This involves ﬁnding the optimal compromise between
normative preference and temptation preference.
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1Denote the space of alternatives by ∆ and the space of menus (nonempty subsets of
∆) by Z. Letting u,v : ∆ → R represent the normative and temptation preferences
respectively, the above story translates into the following representation for an ex ante







η2x v(η) − v(µ)
)}
, x ∈ Z. (1)
The non-negative term (maxη2x v(η) − v(µ)) is the self-control cost of choosing µ from x:
this is strictly positive whenever the choice µ is diﬀerent from the most tempting item in x.
Thus the utility WGP(x) of a menu x is the maximum of normative utility net of self-control
costs, and this value function represents %. Note that the representation ‘suggests’ that
the agent’s ex post choice from a menu x is
CGP(x) = argmax
µ2x {u(µ) − (max
η2x v(η) − v(µ))} = argmax
µ2x {u(µ) + v(µ)}. (2)
That is, the GP agent’s anticipated choices maximize a utility function w = u + v, a
compromise between normative and temptation utility.
Motivation. Decision-making under temptation involves a compromise between two po-
tentially conﬂicting underlying preferences. This paper proposes that a plausible outcome
of this internal conﬂict is that choice behavior may be inconsistent across choice problems,
in the sense of violating the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP): if the agent
reveals a preference for µ over η in some choice situation, then temptation may well lead
him to exhibit a strict preference for η over µ in a diﬀerent choice situation, in contradic-
tion to WARP. More speciﬁcally, we hold that an agent’s ability to resist temptation may
well depend on what is available in the menu: self-control may be menu-dependent. For
instance, the extent to which an agent deviates from his diet may depend on the strength
of his sugar craving, and the strength of this craving may in turn depend on the desserts
that are available to him. Clearly, when self-control is menu-dependent, the agent’s choices
may not satisfy WARP. The dieter may resist temptation and choose to have no dessert
from the menu {no dessert, small piece of cake}, but the presence of a large piece of cake
in {no dessert, small piece of cake, large piece of cake} may trigger a strong sugar craving,
which he responds to by choosing the small piece of cake, the compromise between his
strong craving and his normative preference.
Examples suggestive of temptation-driven violations of WARP are available in the ex-
perimental literature on social preferences (List [26], Bardsley [5]). Consider the following
experiment involving the dictator game [26]. ‘Dictators’ and ‘recipients’ were given an
endowment ($10,$5), where $10 denotes the dictator’s endowment and $5 the recipient’s.
Each dictator was given the option of sharing any part of $5 from his endowment with a
recipient,1 that is, they were oﬀered the menu:
x1 = {(10 − x,5 + x) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 5}.
1More precisely, they could share only in $0.5 increments. We abstract away from this in the description.
2The mean oﬀer among dictators was $1. However, when given also the option of taking
exactly $1 from the recipients,
x2 = x1 ∪ {(11,4)},
few dictators took the new option but the rate of giving substantially declined, and the
mean oﬀer fell to $0. In the context of social preferences, it is natural to hypothesize
a normative desire to share but a temptation to be selﬁsh. The above ﬁnding suggests
that greater temptation may cause choice to become more closely aligned with temptation
preferences.
Model. While the behavior described by WARP is widely considered as acceptable for a
standard theory of choice, we hold that it is not intuitive for a theory of decision-making
under temptation. While WARP (or a probabilistic version of it) is a peculiar feature of
most models put forth in the literature on self-control, and indeed is evident in (2) for GP’s
model, in this paper we introduce and study a generalization of GP’s model that gives rise











η2x v(η) − v(µ)
)}
, x ∈ Z,
where ψ(·) ≥ 0 is increasing.2 The model captures the idea that self-control may weaken
in the presence of temptation, and this feature drives violations of WARP. To see this,























Thus ψ(·) is the weight on temptation utility and parametrizes the agent’s self-control,
or lack of it thereof, at the moment of choice. Menu-dependence obtains through ψ(·),
speciﬁcally via the degree of temptation in the menu, given by ‘maxx v’.
We study the behavioral foundations of the TDSC model and also explore its implica-
tions for ex post choice C. As an application we use the model to unify disparate evidence
from experimental evidence on choice under risk and over time. A similar application has
been done by Fudenberg-Levine [16, 17], Noor-Takeoka [30] and Takeoka [34] for the Con-
vex Self-Control model, which is a model that exhibits convex costs of self-control. We
show that the TDSC model accommodates more experimental ﬁndings.
2We note that our companion paper (Noor and Takeoka [30]) includes a more general representation
with self-control cost of the general form c(µ,maxx v). Nevertheless, the present paper is more fundamental:
a key lemma we prove here was crucial for the general result in the companion paper. We note also that
the proof for the TDSC representation does not take the general form c(µ,maxx v) as a starting point but
follows a diﬀerent construction of self-control costs. See Section 3.2 for more details.
3Contribution. GP’s axiomatization of their model makes use of four axioms: Order,
Continuity, Independence and Set-Betweenness. The ﬁrst three are natural extensions of
the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms to a sets of lotteries setting, and the fourth ex-
presses the agent’s temptation and anticipated choice from menus. Of the four axioms,
Set-Betweenness is clearly a substantive axiom for a model of decision under temptation.
Indeed, existing generalizations of GP’s model (Chatterjee and Krishna [9], Dekel, Lipman
and Rustichini [11], Kopylov [24], Stovall [33]) have focused on relaxing Set-Betweenness
while maintaining Independence.3 Yet it is not clear what is the justiﬁcation for assuming
Independence in a model of self-control (beyond the fact that it is the adaptation of a
standard axiom in decision theory). Moreover, it is not well understood how exactly Inde-
pendence ‘works’ – for instance, it is not known what is the weakest form of Independence
that yields the existence of a vNM temptation preference and whether the full force of
Independence is required to get linearity of self-control costs. This paper gets a handle on
such questions, and more broadly it clariﬁes the price of adopting the Independence axiom
by highlighting that there are substantive stories about self-control that are inconsistent
with Independence. The TDSC model, for instance, is obtained by relaxing Independence,
not Set-Betweenness.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes GP’s model and
identiﬁes conditions that lead to the existence of vNM temptation preferences and those
that rule out violations of WARP. Section 3 presents our model – it provides axioms, a
representation theorem and a uniqueness theorem. Section 4 studies testable implications
of the model for ex post choice. Section 5 demonstrates how the ex post choice generated
by the model can accommodate various ﬁndings (from experiments on choice under risk
and time) within a single speciﬁcation. Section 6 discusses related research on convex
self-control models, and Section 7 concludes by discussing alternative theories of menu-
dependent self-control. All proofs are relegated to appendices.
2 Implications of Independence and Set-Betweenness
We introduce GP [18] and then present two theorems that determine conditions that guar-
antee the existence of a linear temptation preference and menu-independent self-control
respectively.
3The exceptions are as follows. In Noor and Takeoka [30] we relax Independence in order to study
non-linear self-control costs - the paper will be discussed (along with the work by Fudenberg-Levine [16])
in Section 6. Epstein and Kopylov [13] provide a theory of “cold feet” using a GP-style model of agents
who are tempted, post-choice, to change beliefs over a state space. Their model violates Independence.
However, their’s is not a generalization of GP [18] because their choice domain is specialized to the set of
menus of Anscombe-Aumann acts.
42.1 The GP Model and Our Objective
For any compact metric space X, ∆(X) denotes the set of all probability measures on
the Borel σ-algebra of X, endowed with the weak convergence topology; ∆(X) is compact
and metrizable [2], and we often write it simply as ∆. Let Z = K(∆) denote the set of
all nonempty compact subsets of ∆. When endowed with the Hausdorﬀ topology, Z is a
compact metric space [8, p. 222]. An element x ∈ Z is referred to as a menu. Generic
elements of Z are x,y,z whereas generic elements of ∆ are µ,η,ν. For α ∈ [0,1], µαη ∈ ∆
is the α-mixture that assigns αµ(A)+(1−α)η(A) to each A in the Borel σ−algebra of X.
Similarly, xαy ≡ {µαη : µ ∈ x,η ∈ y} ∈ Z is an α-mixture of menus x and y.
GP model an agent who struggles with temptation when choosing from a menu, and
foresees this in an ex-ante stage where he selects a menu. This ex ante preference % over
Z is the primitive of the model (ex-post choice is unmodelled). GP adopt the following
axioms.
Axiom 1 (Order) % is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity) The sets {y ∈ Z : y % x} and {y ∈ Z : x % y} are closed for
each x ∈ Z.
Axiom 3 (Independence) For any x,y,z ∈ Z and α ∈ (0,1),
x   y =⇒ αx + (1 − α)z   αy + (1 − α)z.
Axiom 4 (Set-Betweenness) For all x,y ∈ Z,
x % y =⇒ x % x ∪ y % y.
Order, Continuity and Independence are variants of the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms adapted to a preferences-over-menus setting. We recall GP’s interpretation of In-
dependence in Section 3. The anticipation of a struggle with temptation is reﬂected in
Set-Betweenness. A preference for commitment,
x   x ∪ y,
reveals temptation by some alternative in y. Anticipated behavior is revealed as follows.
Suppose {µ}   {η}. When {µ,η} ∼ {η} holds, the indiﬀerence suggests that the agent
would choose the same item when faced with {µ,η} or {η}. The ranking {µ,η}   {η}
suggests that µ is chosen from {µ,η}. Observe that if {µ}   {µ,η}, that is, if η is
tempting, then the preceding rankings reveal whether the agent anticipates successfully
exerting self-control.
GP prove the following representation theorem. The representation was discussed in
the Introduction.
5Theorem 1 (Gul-Pesendorfer (2001)) A preference % satisﬁes Axioms A1-A4 if and
only if there exist continuous and linear utilities u,v : ∆ → R such that % is represented
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, x ∈ Z.
Our objective to ﬁnd the minimal departure from GP’s model that admits menu-
dependent self-control. This requires us to ﬁrst understand clearly the behavioral meaning
(in terms of %) of menu-independent self-control, and to identify a set of weak conditions
that guarantee it. At the same time, in order to retain the vNM structure of commitment
and temptation preferences, we need to determine a set of weak conditions that guarantee
these. The two theorems below will deliver these two sets of conditions, and will serve as
the stepping stones for our axiomatic model of menu-dependent self-control.
2.2 vNM Commitment and Temptation Preference
Consider some axioms that weaken GP’s Continuity, Set-Betweenness and Independence
axioms.
Axiom 5 (Semi-Continuity) The following sets are closed for each x ∈ Z:
{y ∈ Z : y % x} and {{η} ∈ Z : x % {η}}.
The ﬁrst claim states that upper contour sets are closed, while the second states that the
set of singletons in the lower contour set of a menu is closed. Note that Semi-Continuity
implies that commitment preference must be continuous in the sense that the sets {η :
{η} % {µ}} and {η : {µ} % {η}} are closed for each µ ∈ ∆.
The next axiom is a restriction of Set-Betweenness to singleton menus.
Axiom 6 (Binary Set-Betweenness) For all µ,η ∈ ∆,
{µ} % {η} =⇒ {µ} % {µ,η} % {η}.
Binary Set-Betweenness does not restrict the nature of menu-dependence of self-control
in any way. Self-control is not relevant for singleton menu, and although it may be relevant
for binary menus, the comparison of a binary menu with a singleton menu speaks nothing
of the nature of menu-dependence of self-control.
The next three axioms express the vNM structure of the underlying commitment and
temptation preferences.
Axiom 7 (Commitment Independence) For all µ,η,ν ∈ ∆ and α ∈ (0,1),
{µ}   {η} =⇒ {µαν}   {ηαν}.
6This is the vNM Independence axiom imposed on commitment preference. Given Order
and Semi-Continuity, the existence of a vNM representation for commitment preference is
thus guaranteed. The existence of a vNM temptation preference is harder to establish.
Axiom 8 (Temptation Independence) For any µ,η,ν and α ∈ (0,1) s.t. {µ}   {η},
{µ}   {µ,η} ⇐⇒ {µαν}   {µαν,ηαν}.
The axiom states that if ηαν tempts µαν then ηαν0 tempts µαν0 as well. This is clearly
consistent with the existence of a vNM temptation preferences. However, while Order
imposes completeness and transitivity on commitment preferences, none of our axioms
impose these basic properties on temptation preferences. Neither does the following (at
least not on its own), but it ensures that temptation preferences are minimally consistent
with a vNM structure.
Axiom 9 (Temptation Convexity) For any µ,η,η0 and α ∈ (0,1) s.t. {µ}   {η},{η0},
{µ}   {µ,η} and {µ}   {µ,η
0} =⇒ {µ}   {µ,ηαη
0}
{µ} ∼ {µ,η} and {µ} ∼ {µ,η
0} =⇒ {µ} ∼ {µ,ηαη
0}.
The axiom says simply that a mixture of two tempting items is tempting, and a mixture
of two non-tempting items is non-tempting as well.
The following theorem identiﬁes necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
a continuous vNM temptation utility when the preference % has some minimal structure.
Theorem 2 Suppose that % satisﬁes Order, Semi-Continuity, Binary Set-Betweenness and
Commitment Independence. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) % satisﬁes Temptation Independence and Temptation Convexity.
(ii) There exists a continuous linear function v : ∆ → R such that if {µ}   {η} then
{µ}   {µ,η} ⇐⇒ v(η) > v(µ). (4)
Moreover, if there exists µ,η s.t. {µ}   {µ,η} and if there are two such v,v0, then v is
a positive aﬃne transformation of v.
The result identiﬁes the extent to which the Independence axiom is responsible for
the existence of a vNM temptation preference. It tells us that Independence-type restric-
tions that go over and above Temptation Independence and Temptation Convexity require
justiﬁcation in terms of features other than linearity of temptation preference.
The proof of this result is inspired by the literature on vNM extensions of preorders
(Aumann [4], Fishburn [15], Dubra et al [12]). In this literature, conditions on a preorder
(reﬂexive and transitive binary relation) are sought such that there exists a compatible
extension that admits a vNM representation. In our setting, the preference % deﬁnes a set
7T of (not necessarily complete or transitive) temptation preferences over ∆ by the condition
that each T ∈ T satisﬁes:
{η}   {η,µ} =⇒ µTη and ¬ηTµ
{µ} ∼ {µ,η}   {η} =⇒ µTη.
Our theorem identiﬁes conditions that guarantee the existence of a temptation preference
in T that admits a continuous vNM representation. As in the literature, the proof identi-
ﬁes such a preference in the form of a hyperplane that supports an appropriately deﬁned
closed convex cone at the origin. Because our axioms do not guarantee transitivity we
cannot simply invoke results from the literature. Nevertheless similar mathematical tools
(in particular see Dubra et al [12]) are applicable in our setting.
Other related literature includes Abe [1] and Chatterjee and Krishna [9]. Abe [1] also
uses an extension of vNM preorders to obtain a vNM temptation preference.4 His proof
seeks a hyperplane that separates a closed set and an open set, while ours ﬁnds a hyperplane
that supports a closed convex set at the origin. A key diﬀerence is that his proof ﬁrst
seeks a vNM temptation preference that is continuous with respect to a stronger topology
(speciﬁcally, the strongest locally convex topology on the space of signed Borel measures)
than the weak convergence topology. He shows next that the temptation preference is in
fact also continuous with respect to the weak convergence topology by taking advantage
of the fact that the preference over menus (which is assumed to satisfy Independence and
other GP axioms) admits a Strotz representation over ﬁnite menus. In contrast, due to
the demands placed by our objectives, our proof relies on considerably less structure on
preference, and moreover we work with the weak convergence topology throughout.
Chatterjee and Krishna [9, Lemma 4.0.4] derive a vNM temptation preference using
a diﬀerent approach. They deﬁne a temptation relation and verify that it satisﬁes the
vNM axioms. Their proof is constructive but also more involved.5 They also maintain the
Independence axiom, though it is evident from their proof that they do not require the
full force of the axiom: their proof utilizes a ‘Translation Invariance’ condition and the
counterpart of our Temptation Convexity axiom.
2.3 Temptation and WARP
The motivating example in the Introduction involved three alternatives s,m,l (short for
small, medium and large) where l was more tempting than m which in turn was more
tempting than s. The agent in the example chose s from {s,m} but chose m from {s,m,l}.
The idea was that the presence of greater temptation reduces the ability for self-control,
and so while the agent was able to resist temptation in the ﬁrst case and thus choose s over
4We learned of his paper while writing ours, but the ideas were conceived independently, as is reﬂected
in the diﬀerent proof strategies.
5A part of their proof makes use a separating hyperplane argument to show that the temptation pref-
erence they deﬁne is complete and transitive. However, they do not derive a temptation preference in the
form of a separating hyperplane.
8m, the presence of greater temptation in the second case led him to ﬁnd m more desirable
because it oﬀered a compromise.
With this motivating example in mind, we deﬁne a temptation-driven WARP violation
as follows: First, for all µ,η ∈ ∆, say that η weakly tempts µ if either {µ}   {µ,η}
or {η} ∼ {µ,η}   {µ} or µ = η holds. For convenience, this relation is denoted by
η %T µ. Then, a temptation-driven WARP violation is deﬁned by the existence of s,m,l
s.t. l %T m %T s and
{s,m}   {m} and {s,m,l}   {s,l}.
The ﬁrst preference statement suggests that s is chosen over m in a direct comparison. The
second states that the addition of m to {s,l} leads to a strict improvement, which suggests
that m is chosen over s in the presence of l. We seek to understand the conditions on %
under which such behavior is ruled out.
Consider the following axioms. For any menu {µ,η} deﬁne its singleton equivalent
eµη ∈ ∆ by {µ,η} ∼ {eµη}. Singleton equivalents exist under basic conditions on preference,
namely, Order, Continuity, Binary Set Betweenness and Commitment Independence.
Axiom 10 (Partial Mixture Linearity) For any η,µ1,µ2 ∈ ∆ and α ∈ (0,1),
{µi}   {µi,η}   {η}, i = 1,2 =⇒ {µ1αµ2,η} ∼ α{eµ1η} + (1 − α){eµ2η}.
To understand this axiom, observe ﬁrst that an immediate implication of it (given Order
and Commitment Independence) is:
{µ1αµ2}   {µ1αµ2,η}   {η}.
That is, when η tempts µ1 and µ2 but is resistible, then it also resistibly tempts µ1αµ2.
Partial Mixture Linearity states that choosing µ1αµ2 from {µ1αµ2,η} is just as good as a
lottery whose outcomes are as good as choosing µi from {µi,η}, for i = 1,2 with probabil-
ities α and 1 − α resp. Indeed, this suggests that the self-control cost of choosing µ1αµ2
over η is an α-weighted average of the self-control cost of choosing µi over η for i = 1,2
resp. That is, self-control costs are linear. This axiom is implied by Set-Betweenness and
Independence – see [18, Lemma 3].
Axiom 11 (Binary Independence) For all µ,η,ν ∈ ∆ and α ∈ (0,1),
α{µ,η} + (1 − α){ν} ∼ α{eµη} + (1 − α){ν}.
This is a substantial weakening of Independence and is self-explanatory.
Say that % is basic if it satisﬁes Order, Continuity and Binary Set-Betweenness, Com-
mitment Independence, Temptation Independence and Temptation Convexity. We know
from our previous result that this guarantees the existence of a vNM temptation preference.
The following is a key result for this section.
9Theorem 3 If a basic preference % satisﬁes Partial Mixture Linearity and Binary Inde-
pendence, then there do not exist s,m,l s.t. l %T m %T s and
{s,m}   {m} and {m,l}   {s,l}.
In the motivating example, the agent prefers s over m in a direct comparison but chooses
m from {s,m,l}. The source of this violation of WARP is the ‘compromise story’, which
leads him to prefer m over s in the presence of l. This latter preference is expressed precisely
in the ranking {m,l}   {s,l}. Thus the result tells us that the basic story underlying
temptation-driven WARP violations is ruled out under the noted axioms. This is a key
result on the basis of which we can now address the question of when temptation-driven
WARP violations themselves are ruled.
WARP violations are deﬁned using both binary and non-binary menus. Under Set-
Betweenness, non-binary menus are as good as some binary subset [18, Lemma 2]. This
connection permits stories told about binary menus to extend to non-binary menus. The
following corollary takes advantage of this. It shows that under Set-Betweenness, the result
of the above theorem can be extended to establish the nonexistence of a temptation-driven
WARP violation.
Corollary 1 If a basic preference % satisﬁes Set-Betweenness, Partial Mixture Linearity
and Binary Independence, then there does not exist a temptation-driven WARP violation.
3 Temptation-Dependent Self-Control
In this section we present a model that expresses our theory of menu-dependent self-control,
namely that self-control weakens in the presence of temptation.
3.1 Axioms
We seek a minimal departure from GP’s model that expresses such menu-dependent self-
control. We therefore maintain Order, Continuity and Set-Betweenness, and in order to
obtain a vNM commitment and temptation preference, we maintain also Commitment
Independence, Temptation Independence and Temptation Convexity.
The ﬁrst axiom we consider below maintains a weak form of Independence. Recall that
for all µ,η ∈ ∆, η %T µ if and only if either {µ}   {µ,η} or {η} ∼ {µ,η}   {µ} or µ = η
holds. Recall also that for any menu {µ,η}, we deﬁne its singleton equivalent {eµη} by
{µ,η} ∼ {eµη}.
Axiom 12 (Linear Self-Control) For any µ,ν,η ∈ ∆ and α ∈ (0,1), if η %T µ,ν then
α{µ,η} + (1 − α){ν,η} ∼ α{eµη} + (1 − α){eνη}.
10We motivate Linear Self-Control in a manner similar to how GP motivate their Indepen-
dence axiom. Suppose the agent is faced with lotteries over menus, must choose between
the lotteries deﬁned by α ◦ {µ,η} + (1 − α) ◦ {ν,η} and α ◦ {eµη} + (1 − α) ◦ {eνη}, where
the uncertainty resolves before the time of ex post choice. As in the standard justiﬁcation
for Independence, since the resolution of uncertainty leaves the agent with options that
are indiﬀerent to each other, the agent will be indiﬀerent between the lotteries. Linear
Self-Control holds if the agent is in addition indiﬀerent to the timing of resolution of risk.
That is, the agent does not care whether the uncertainty resolves before or after his ex
post choice. While this is a standard restriction when the uncertainty involves singleton
menus, the substantive implication is for uncertainty over non-singleton menus, which is
where temptation is relevant. The axiom suggests that there is no value in the timing
of resolution of risk in alleviating the agent’s expected struggle with temptation in non-
singleton menus that have the same most-tempting alternative, and thus the same level
of maximal temptation. The discussion below clariﬁes why indiﬀerence to timing may be
violated outside this case.
Set-Betweenness and Linear Self-Control in fact imply the Partial Mixture Linearity
axiom in the previous Section (see the proof of Lemma 14). Corollary 1 therefore informs
us that we must relax Binary Independence in order to accommodate the menu-dependent
self-control story told in our motivating example.6 We weaken Binary Independence so as
to permit violations as the temptation level in a menu is varied.
Axiom 13 (Decreasing Self-Control) Assume that α{µ,η}+(1−α){ν} ∼ α{ν}+(1−
α){ν}. Then,
ν %T ν
0 =⇒ α{µ,η} + (1 − α){ν
0} % α{ν} + (1 − α){ν
0},
ν -T ν
0 =⇒ α{µ,η} + (1 − α){ν
0} - α{ν} + (1 − α){ν
0}.
The interesting case is where {µ}   {µ,η}. Then Linear Self-Control (with ν = η) tells
us the hypothesis of Decreasing Self-Control is satisﬁed with
α{µ,η} + (1 − α){η} ∼ α{eµη} + (1 − α){η}.
Suppose η is replaced with a less tempting alternative ν. In the spirit of the justiﬁcation
used for Linear Self-Control, the axiom then says that the replacement gives rise to a
preference for later resolution of uncertainty. Note that with later resolution, while the
agent was initially facing {µαη,ηαη}, after the replacement he faces {µαν,ηαν} and in
6A weak form of Binary Independence is already implied by Linear Self-Control: For any µ,η ∈ ∆ and
α ∈ (0,1), if {µ}   {µ,η} then
α{µ,η} + (1 − α){η} ∼ α{eµη} + (1 − α){η}.
This is the special case of Linear Self-Control where ν = η, and is also a special case of Binary Independence
where temptation is not varied in a menu.
11particular the replacement puts him in the presence of lower temptation (going from ηαη
to ηαν). This preference for later resolution may therefore arise because the agent’s self-
control is enhanced with the reduction of temptation. The axiom also states that if later
resolution leads him to face a menu with higher temptation, he prefers early resolution.
Since we have weakened Independence, we require a little more structure before we can
prove a representation theorem. Our ﬁnal axiom is arguably uncontentious.
Axiom 14 (Temptation Aversion) If {µ}   {µ,η}   {η} for some µ,η, then for any
ν,
ν -T η =⇒ {µ,ν} % {µ,η}.
Suppose that the menu {µ,η} is such that η is tempting but resisted. The axiom makes
the simple and intuitive claim that if η is replaced with something less tempting, then
the menu becomes more attractive. This is intuitive particularly considering that we are
modelling an agent whose self-control improves in the presence of lower temptation. This
axiom is familiar from Noor and Takeoka [30].
3.2 Representation Theorems
In Noor and Takeoka [30] we deﬁne a General Self-Control preference as a preference
% over Z that satisﬁes Order, Continuity, Set-Betweenness, Commitment Independence,
Temptation Independence, Temptation Convexity and Temptation Aversion. We show











which generalizes GP so as to retain its basic features while expunging linearity and im-
posing minimal structure on the nature of the cost of self-control, captured by the cost
function c : ∆ × v(∆) → R+. In Noor-Takeoka [30] we study a specialization that features
convex self-control costs (see Section 6 below). The following theorem – our main theo-
rem in this paper – yields an alternative specialization that captures temptation-dependent
self-control.
Theorem 4 A preference % is a General Self-Control preference that satisﬁes Linear Self-
Control and Decreasing Self-Control if and only if there exists a representation W : Z → R















for continuous linear functions u,v : ∆ → R+ and some continuous and weakly increasing
function ψ : v(∆) → R+ such that ψ(l) > 0 for all l > minv(∆).
12There are two main diﬀerences from the representation theorem (5) for General Self-
Control preferences. First, the representation theorem for General Self-Control preferences
relies in a fundamental way on the key result obtained in Theorem 2 of this paper, that is,
the existence of a vNM temptation utility. Second, the proof of Theorem 4 does not start
with the general representation (5) and impose additional axioms in order to specialize the
self-control costs into the desired form. Rather, we use a diﬀerent construction altogether,
which achieves a separation between the “temptation frustration” (that is, maxx v − v(µ))
and the menu-dependent eﬀect ψ(maxx v). An outline of the proof is presented in the next
subsection, while a formal proof is relegated to Appendix C.
Say that % is a TDSC preference if it admits a TDSC representation. We present two
corollaries that are of interest. The ﬁrst yields a strictly increasing ψ.
Corollary 2 A TDSC preference % admits a TDSC representation with a continuous
strictly increasing function ψ : v(∆) → R+ if and only if % satisﬁes the following axiom:
For any µ,η ∈ ∆ and α ∈ (0,1), if {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}, then
α{µ,η} + (1 − α){µ}   α{eµη} + (1 − α){µ}.
Say that % is a strict TDSC preference if it admits a TDSC representation with a
strictly increasing ψ. The condition is interpreted in a fashion similar to the axioms in the
preceding subsection. Speciﬁcally, it states that strictly reducing the temptation in a menu
gives rise to a strict increase in its attractiveness relative to the constant self-control case.
This expresses the idea that self-control strictly increases if temptation is reduced.
The next corollary is an axiomatization of GP. Recall the Binary Independence axiom
discussed in Section 2.3.
Corollary 3 A TDSC preference % admits a TDSC representation with a constant func-
tion ψ : v(∆) → R++ if and only if % satisﬁes Binary Independence.
The result reveals the various implications of assuming that a preference satisfying Or-
der, Continuity and Set-Betweenness also satisﬁes Independence, thereby highlighting what
is bought with Independence and how precisely it interacts with preferences to characterize
the model.
Finally, consider the uniqueness properties of the TDSC representation. Given a repre-
sentation (u,v,ψ), the self-control subdomain is deﬁned as follows:
L = {l ∈ R+ |l = v(η) for some µ,η s.t. {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}}.
This is the set of all values of v(η) for which {µ}   {µ,η}   {η} holds for some µ. Observe
that if v(η) / ∈ L, then for any µ such that {µ}   {η}, it must be that either there is no
temptation in {µ,η} or there is overwhelming temptation. In either case, the precise shape
of ψ is immaterial for the description of choice behavior; for instance it could be increased
without aﬀecting behavior. Thus, the precise shape of ψ is meaningful only on L. Notice
13also that L is an interval with inf L = min∆ v.7 Say that preference % is nondegenerate if
there exists µ,η such that {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}.
Theorem 5 Suppose that (u,v,ψ) and (u0,v0,ψ0) are both representations of a nondegen-
erate TDSC preference. Then there exist constants αu,αv > 0 and βu,βv ∈ R such that
u
0 = αuu + βu, v
0 = αvv + βv.
Moreover, if L and L0 are the self-control subdomains associated with the two representa-
tions, then
L
0 = αvL + βv, and ψ
0(αvl + βv) =
αu
αv
ψ(l) for all l ∈ L.
Note that αvL+βv is standard notation for the set {αvl +βv |l ∈ L}. See Appendix D
for the proof. A corollary of the uniqueness result is that if the functions W 0,W : Z → R
represent the same nondegenerate TDSC preference, then there exist constants αu > 0 and
βu such that for all x,
W
0(x) = αuW(x) + βu.
That is, TDSC utility functions are unique up to an aﬃne transformation.
3.3 Proof Outline for Theorem 4
The TDSC representation is constructed as follows. First, Order, Continuity, and Com-
mitment Independence ensure that there exists a continuous mixture linear representation
u : ∆ → R of commitment ranking. By Theorem 2, there exists a continuous mixture
linear temptation utility v : ∆ → R such that
{µ}   {µ,η} ⇒ v(η) > v(µ), and {η} ∼ {µ,η}   {µ} ⇒ v(η) ≥ v(µ).
Since u is continuous on ∆, there exists a maximal and a minimal lottery µ∆,µ∆ ∈ ∆ with
respect to u. Given Continuity and Set Betweenness, we can show that for each x ∈ Z it
must be that {µ∆} % x % {µ∆} and there exists a unique number α(x) ∈ [0,1] such that
x ∼ {µ∆α(x)µ∆}. Thus,
W(x) ≡ u(µ
∆α(x)µ∆)
is a representation of % such that W({µ}) = u(µ) for all µ ∈ ∆.
7To see this, take any l ∈ L. By deﬁnition, there exists µ,η such that l = v(η) and {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}.
Moreover, let ν be a minimal lottery with respect to v. By the representation, for all α ∈ (0,1),
u(µ) − ψ(v(η))(v(η) − v(µ)) > u(η)
⇒ u(µαν) − ψ(v(η))(v(ηαν) − v(µαν)) > u(ηαν)
⇒ u(µαν) − ψ(v(ηαν))(v(ηαν) − v(µαν)) > u(ηαν),
which implies that {µαν}   {µαν,ηαν}   {ηαν} and αl + (1 − α)min∆ v ∈ L.
14The next question is how to deﬁne ψ : v(∆) → R+ and show that W has the desired
form. As a ﬁrst step, we deﬁne the self-control cost function. Take any lotteries µ,η with
{µ}   {µ,η}   {η}. This ranking suggests that self-control is exerted in {µ,η}. Thus,
the diﬀerence u(µ)−W({µ,η}) should express the self-control cost when the absolute level
of temptation is v(η) and the temptation frustration is v(η) − v(µ). Thus, deﬁne the
self-control cost function ϕ(l,w) as
ϕ(v(η),v(η) − v(µ)) = u(µ) − W({µ,η}).
To show that this deﬁnition is indeed well-deﬁned, we need to show that for any other µ0,η0
with {µ0}   {µ0,η0}   {η0},
v(η) = v(η
0) and v(µ) = v(µ




This key result comes from the following observations. Intuitively, Decreasing Self-
Control implies that if v(ν) = v(ν0) then
{µ,η}α{ν} ∼ {ν}α{ν} ⇐⇒ {µ,η}α{ν
0} ∼ {ν}α{ν
0}. (7)
That is, the ranking of {µ,η} and {ν} when mixed with a common singleton {ν} is un-
changed when the singleton is replaced with one containing an equally tempting lottery.
This reﬂects a ‘translation invariance’ property that states that if a common ‘translation’
is applied to the elements of both the menus {µ,η} and {ν}, then the ranking of the menus
is unaﬀected. More formally, a translation is a vector θ ∈ Rn such that
∑n
i=1 θ(i) = 0.
We say that a translation θ is admissible for a menu x if µ + θ ∈ ∆ for all µ ∈ x. The
counterpart of (7) for the representation is the following “translation linearity” property:
if θ is admissible for {µ,η}, then 9
v(θ) = 0 =⇒ W({µ + θ,η + θ}) = W({µ,η}) + u(θ). (8)
This is used to show (6). So suppose v(η) = v(η0) and v(µ) = v(µ0). To consider the
simplest case, assume that the translation θ ≡ µ0 − µ is admissible for {µ,η}.10 Note that
v(θ) = 0. By (8), {µ}   {µ,η}   {η} implies {µ + θ}   {µ + θ,η + θ}   {η + θ}, that is,
{µ0}   {µ0,η + θ}   {η + θ}. Since v(η0) = v(η + θ) by assumption, Temptation Aversion




0,η + θ}) = W({µ,η}) + u(θ) = W({µ,η}) + u(µ
0) − u(µ),
as desired.
8By Continuity and the fact that the set of all lotteries with ﬁnite supports is dense in ∆ under the weak
convergence topology, we can assume also that µ,µ0,η,η0 have ﬁnite supports, and hence can be viewed as
vectors in a ﬁnite dimensional space Rn.





10In general, θ ≡ µ0−µ is not necessarily admissible for {µ,η}. Then, we need more elaborated arguments.
See Lemma 20 in Appendix C for details.
15The next step is to show that ϕ(l,w) is homogeneous of degree one with respect to w.
This property comes from Linear Self-Control. Take any µ,η with {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}.
Let l = v(η) and w = v(η) − v(µ). By Linear Self-Control, for all α ∈ (0,1), {µ,η}α{η} ∼
{eµη}α{η}. By deﬁnition of ϕ,
u(µαη) − ϕ(l,αw) = α(u(µ) − ϕ(l,w)) + (1 − α)u(η).













By using (u,v,ψ) deﬁned as above, we ﬁrst show that the desired representation is
possible for binary menus. In this step, ψ is extended appropriately to the whole domain
v(∆) in an increasing way. The remaining argument is more or less the same as in Gul and
Pesendorfer [18]. Since % satisﬁes Set Betweenness, the representation can be extended to
the set of all ﬁnite menus. Finally, by Continuity and a property of the Hausdorﬀ metric,
the representation can be extended to Z as desired.
4 Extended TDSC Model
GP’s model and its generalizations in the literature – including the TDSC model – take
the form of a representation for an ex ante preferences over menus, but the key object of
interest in these models is the agent’s ex post choice from menus. However, foundations
for any assertion about the nature of ex post choice in these models are absent: indeed,
ex post choice in these models is derived merely as an interpretation of a functional form.
While this detraction is common for the literature, it is particularly problematic for this
paper since our emphasis is explicitly on the nature of ex post choice. To rectify this, we
provide complete foundations for the TDSC model. The interest here is in understanding
the properties of ex post choice implied by the model.
Our extended TDSC model takes as its primitives an ex ante preference % over menus
like before, and also a choice correspondence that captures ex post choice from menus.
Deﬁnition 1 C : Z Ã ∆ is a choice correspondence if it is upper hemicontinuous, non-
empty and closed-valued and satisﬁes C(x) ⊂ x for all x ∈ Z.
Consider the following restrictions. The ﬁrst is just a restriction of WARP to pairs of
menus that are ex ante indiﬀerent to each other.
16Axiom 15 (Weak WARP) Suppose y ∼ x and µ,η ∈ x ∩ y. Then
µ ∈ C(x) and η ∈ C(y) =⇒ µ ∈ C(y).
Given the hypothesis, y ∼ x implies that choosing µ in x is just as good as choosing η
in y, from the ex ante perspective. But since µ is (weakly) chosen over η in x then it follows
that choosing η in x is (weakly) worse than choosing η in y, which is only possible if the
temptation in x is (weakly) greater. But then choosing µ in y must be (weakly) better than
choosing µ in x, which is already known to be as good as choosing η in y. It follows that
choosing µ in y is (weakly) better than choosing η in y, and so it must be that µ ∈ C(y).
Axiom 16 (ex post Decreasing Self-Control) If {µ}   {µ,η} then
µ ∈ C({µ,η}) =⇒ C({µ,µαη}) = {µ} for all α ∈ (0,1).
This restriction says that if the agent normatively prefers µ over η but is tempted by
the latter, then his self-control can only increase if η is replaced by something less tempting
(for instance, µαη as in the axiom). Thus, if he can pick µ from {µ,η} – albeit not uniquely
if he is on the margin between exerting self-control or not – then he can pick µ uniquely in
{µ,µαη}. The idea that a reduction in temptation increases self-control is the heart of the
TDSC model, and the restriction is its expression in ex post choice.
Our ﬁnal axiom expresses the agent’s sophistication: the choice from a menu he antici-
pates ex ante is the one he makes ex post. The axiom requires a way to express that one
menu contains more temptation that another. When {µ}  ∼ {η}, then we can directly infer
if µ tempts η or the converse. However, if {µ} ∼ {η} then the only way to infer which
is more tempting is to see whether rewards in the neighborhood of µ tempt those in the
neighborhood of η, or conversely. Indeed, we can infer that η is temptation-ranked weakly
higher than µ if there exists a sequence (µn,ηn) → (µ,η) s.t. ηn %T µn for all n. Say
that a menu x temptation-dominates a lottery µ if there is η ∈ x that is revealed to be
temptation-ranked weakly higher than µ in this way.
Axiom 17 (Sophistication) For any x and µ,
x ∪ {µ}   x =⇒ C(x ∪ {µ}) = {µ}.
Moreover, the converse holds if x temptation-dominates µ.
If adding µ to x makes the menu strictly more attractive then it should be because µ is
chosen in the new menu – otherwise µ would only potentially add to temptation thereby
making the menu weakly less attractive. The restriction requires that choice behavior
respect this suggested implication of the ranking of menus. For the converse, if µ is uniquely
chosen from x ∪ {µ} then in general it is not obvious that x ∪ {µ}   x, because µ could
be a unique overwhelmingly tempting alternative in x ∪ {µ} in which case we could have
x ∪ {µ}    x. However, when x temptation-dominates µ, then we can be sure that µ is
17not a unique overwhelmingly tempting alternative, and the only possibility that remains is
x ∪ {µ}   x.
Say that % is nondegenerate¤ if there exists µ¤,η¤,µ0,η0 s.t. {µ¤}   {µ¤,η¤}   {η¤}
and {µ0} ∼ {µ0,η0}   {η0}.
Theorem 6 Suppose that C is a choice correspondence and % is a nondegenerate¤ prefer-
ence satisfying the axioms of the strict TDSC model. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
(i) The pair (C,%) satisﬁes Weak WARP, ex post Decreasing Self-Control and Sophis-
tication.
























The theorem speciﬁes that the three axioms of this section are the key joint implications
of the TDSC model for ex ante preference % and ex post choice C.
5 Implications for Risk and Time Preference












We show that this agent’s choices exhibit properties observed in experiments. The agent’s
choices may be such because he is a TDSC agent. But strictly speaking there is no reason
to commit to this because the experiments do not involve a ranking of menus or choice
from menus with more than two items. Indeed, the choice correspondence (9) may well be
consistent with other models.
At the end of the section we suggest additional experiments might support a temptation-
based explanation for the following ﬁndings.
5.1 Risk
Throughout we assume that X is a closed interval of money and that u and v are increasing
and concave on X. We also assume that v is more risk averse than u.11 The last assumption
is supported by the evidence surveyed in Loewenstein et al [27], where it is suggested that
11The axiom on ex ante preference % that characterizes this is that for any degenerate lottery c and any
lottery µ, {c}   {µ} =⇒ {c} ∼ {c,µ}   {µ}. We omit the straightforward proof.
18the emotional response to risk is that of aversion and dread. The assumption generates the
following behaviors.
Common Ratio Eﬀect. Subjects in experiments are typically observed to choose $3000
over a 0.8 chance of $4000, while also choosing a 0.2 chance of $4000 over a 0.25 chance
of $3000. This violates the vNM Independence axiom. Letting r denote a non-degenerate
lottery, s a degenerate nonzero lottery, and 0 the degenerate zero lottery, the Common
Ratio Eﬀect is given by
C({r,s}) = {s} and C({rα0,sα0}) = {rα0}.
If u prefers r to s and v has the opposite preference, then the above choices arise if:
u(s) + ψ(v(s))v(s) > u(r) + ψ(v(s))v(r)
u(rα0) + ψ(v(sα0))v(rα0) > u(sα0) + ψ(v(sα0))v(sα0).
Intuitively, by mixing all alternatives with 0, the weight ψ(maxx v) on v reduces, thus
causing a decrease in risk aversion.
Common Consequence Eﬀect. This is the popular form of the Allais Paradox. Subjects
prefer $1m to a lottery that yields a 0.1 chance for $5m, 0.89 chance of $1m and 0.01 chance
of 0, but they prefer 0.1 chance of 5m to a 0.11 chance of 1m. Letting r denote a non-
degenerate lottery, s is a degenerate nonzero lottery, and 0 the degenerate zero lottery, the
Common Consequence Eﬀect is given by
C({sαs,rαs}) = {sαs} and C({sα0,rα0}) = {rα0}.
If u prefers r to s and v has the opposite preference, then these choices arise if:
u(sαs) + ψ(v(sαs))v(sαs) > u(rαs) + ψ(v(sαs))v(rαs),
u(rα0) + ψ(v(sα0))v(rα0) > u(sα0) + ψ(v(sα0))v(sα0).
These inequalities are equivalent to
u(s) + ψ(v(s))v(s) > u(r) + ψ(v(s))v(r), (10)
u(r) + ψ(v(sα0))v(r) > u(s) + ψ(v(sα0))v(s). (11)
Thus the intuition is as in the Common Ratio Eﬀect: the second set of choices correspond
to a reduced weight ψ(maxx v) on v, thus causing a decrease in risk aversion.
Risk Aversion and Stakes Size. Estimates both from the ﬁeld and the lab show that risk
aversion tends to increase with stake size (see Holt and Laury [21] and the reference cited
therein). In our model, increase in stake size is associated with a reduction in self-control,
and thus an increase in risk aversion.
195.2 Risk and Time
The TDSC model can readily be extended to an inﬁnite horizon in the style of GP [19]
where there is temptation by immediate consumption. We omit an axiomatization of the
extension because it involves no new ideas. The following choice correspondence would be
implied by such an extension, but as before, the choice model can in principle be taken
separately from the TDSC model.
Let X = ∆1 and endow it with the product topology. A generic element is denoted
c = (µ0,µ1,...). Consider a choice correspondence


















Thus, the agent’s normative and temptation perspectives evaluate a stream c = (µ0,µ1,...)




γtv(µt) respectively. As in the pre-
vious subsection, assume that v is more risk averse than u. We assume further that γ ≤ δ,
although we note below that γ > δ is consistent with the behaviors we discuss if we place
restrictions on ψ. It will be convenient to let u(0) = v(0) = 0 for some degenerate lottery 0,
which is naturally interpreted as the reward that yields zero. Below we also abuse notation
and use 0 to denote the degenerate stream (0,0,...) yielding no reward in every period. For
any stream c deﬁne c+0 = c and inductively c+(t+1) = (0,c+t).
Preference Reversals. A preference reversal is:
C({c




that is, an agent may choose a later reward c+(T+1) over a sooner reward d+T when both are
in the future (T > 0), but may choose the immediate reward d over the later reward c+1.
GP’s model generates preference reversals: if normative and temptation utilities are speci-
ﬁed as above, then preference reversals arise if and only if temptation preference discounts
the future more steeply than normative preference, γ < δ (GP [19] assume speciﬁcally that
γ = 0). Intuitively, due to the diﬀering discount rates, normative preferences dominate the
choice of more distant rewards. Thus, if temptation sways choice when the rewards are
close, a reversal will take place as the rewards are delayed. This mechanism can exist also in
our model, but we get preference reversals even if this mechanism is shut down (by taking
γ = δ), in which case they are driven purely by menu-dependence of self-control. That is,
delaying the rewards also reduces the maximum temptation the agent is faced with, which
in turn increases self-control and thus if temptation drives the choice C({c+1,d}) = {d},
with suﬃcient delay this temptation will be resisted and a preference reversal will arise.
More precisely and in more general terms, it is straightforward to show that for any pair
of streams a and b where b is more tempting, and for any delay T, C({a+T,b+T}) = {a+T}
































Observe that as T grows, the weight ψ(γT ∑1
t=0 γtv(bt)) on temptation utility reduces.
Temptation utility further loses importance relative to normative utility because it dis-
counts the future relatively more steeply – this acts via the factor
(γ
δ
)T. Thus, even if
temptation sways choice when T = 0, normative preferences begin to dominate choice for
large T, thus causing a preference reversal.
Finally, we observe that the assumption γ ≤ δ is not necessary for our model to generate
preference reversals. For instance, if the weighting function takes the form ψ(l) = lθ, θ ≥ 0,
then preference reversals arise if γθ+1 < δ. Thus, menu-dependent self-control can give
rise to preference reversals even if γ > δ. If θ = 0, then ψ(l) = 1 for all l, and the
above condition for preference reversal is reduced to γ < δ, which corresponds to GP’s
assumption.
The subsequent experimental ﬁndings concern interactions between risk and time. The
TDSC model accommodates these ﬁndings, whereas GP [19] do not.
Preference Reversals and Risk. It is observed by Keren and Roelofsma [23] and We-
ber and Chapman [36] that preference reversals tend to disappear when all rewards are







It is clear why our model would exhibit this: Since both of delaying rewards and mixing




γtv, choice from menus will tend
to be determined by
∑
δtu.
The Allais Paradoxes and Time. Weber and Chapman [36] ﬁnd that the Common
Consequence Eﬀect tends to disappear when the lotteries are delayed, and Baucells and
Heukamp [6] show that the same is true also for the Common Ratio Eﬀect. In particular,
choices over lotteries were less inconsistent with expected utility theory when the lotteries
were to be played out in the future. This is exhibited in our model because future lotteries
tend to be determined by
∑
δtu, as above.
Risk Attitude and the ‘Moment of Truth’. Some studies suggest that people tend
to be less risk averse towards gambles that are played out in the future than those in the
present. According to Liberman et al [25] subjects focus on rewards when evaluating distant
21gambles and on probabilities when evaluating current gambles.12 Loewenstein et al [27] and
Savitsky et al [32] hypothesize that the emotional response to risk is that of risk aversion,
and thus there is increased risk aversion as the ‘moment of truth’ approaches. In our model,
the agent’s preference over current gambles is determined by a convex combination of two
utilities, one more risk averse than the other, but those over delayed gambles is determined
by the less risk averse utility. Thus our model generates this ﬁnding.
5.3 Standard Explanations and Further Experiments
The existing explanations for these ﬁndings is as follows. There is a literature on non-
Expected Utility for decision theoretic models that seeks to accommodate the Allais para-
doxes. The paradoxes can be explained by how probability weights change for small vs
large probabilities, or concerns of anticipated disappointment, etc. The main explanation
for the observed relation between choice under risk and over time is due to Keren and
Roelofsma [23], who hypothesize that the ﬁndings arise because the future is inherently
risky.13 Thus, delaying a sure reward or making an immediate reward uncertain give rise
to the same eﬀect on decisions.
We showed that temptation-dependent self-control, coupled with a temptation to be risk
averse and impatient, can replicate the same ﬁndings that motivated the above literatures.
However, further experiments are required in order to support or reject the possibility that
temptation might serve as an explanation for the ﬁndings. There seem to be at least two
avenues to explore:
1- Dynamically inconsistent choice behavior is one possible indication of temptation.
Therefore an avenue to explore is whether such reversals are associated also with dynamic
inconsistency. That is, would subjects’ preferences over lotteries played at time t + 1
depend on whether preferences are elicited at t or t + 1? The evidence ﬁnds that from the
perspective of one point it time, risk preferences reverse with delay, and so it is conceivable
that dynamic inconsistency would be found. If it is indeed found, it may be explored next
whether the agent at time t would seek to commit to her choices. (However, the latter
would presume sophistication on the part of agents).
2- A key implication of the idea of temptation-dependent self-control for ex post
choice is the existence of violations of WARP. A sizable experimental literature documents
that choice under risk violates WARP. Much of the literature focusses on establishing the
counterparts of violations observed in riskless settings, which seem unrelated to issues of
self-control.14 An avenue to explore is whether the presence of unchosen safe lotteries can
cause an increase in risk aversion.
12In [25], subjects actually tended to prefer mean-preserving spreads for future gambles.
13See Halevy [20] for a model that formalizes this idea.
14For instance, the experiments ﬁnd the attraction eﬀect (an alternative is more likely to be chosen after
the introduction of an inferior version of it) and the compromise eﬀect (an alternative is more likely to be
chosen if it serves as a compromise between two other alternatives).
226 Comparison with Convex Self-Control Models
Fudenberg-Levine [16, 17], Noor-Takeoka [30] and Takeoka [34] hypothesize that the marginal
cost of exerting self-control is increasing – to support this Fudenberg-Levine cite psycho-
logical research that suggests that self-control is a limited resource.15 In a GP framework,











for a convex function ϕ. In a game-theoretic setting, Fudenberg-Levine model a long-
run patient self and a sequence of short-run impulsive selves where the long-run self can
inﬂuence the utility of the short-run selves at a cost that might be convex. Convex self-
control costs give rise to violations of WARP of the type that motivate this paper: an agent
may resist temptation and choose µ over η but when a greater temptation ν is introduced,
the increased marginal cost of resisting temptation may cause him to choose η. The reduced
form of the model is analogous to a dynamic extension of the Convex Self-Control model
where there is a temptation by immediate consumption (as in GP [19]), but where u = v.
See below for further comments.
Comparison with Takeoka [34] and Noor-Takeoka [30]: Takeoka [34] observes
that convex self-control can produce (a) the Common Ratio Eﬀect, (b) the Keren and
Roelofsma [23] ﬁnding, and (c) the relationship between the Common Ratio Eﬀect and
time. The TDSC model can explain more experimental evidence than the Convex Self-
Control model, and has diﬀerent implications on ex post choice in the following ways:
A1- Our model accommodates the Common Consequence Eﬀect – the original and
popular form of the Allais paradox – while the Convex Self-Control model cannot. Observe
that
ϕ(v(µ
0αη) − v(µαη)) = ϕ(α[v(µ
0) − v(µ)]),
that is, the self-control cost of choosing µαη over µ0αη is independent of η. Thus, the
dependence of self-control costs on a ‘diﬀerence of temptation utilities’ gives rise to an
irrelevance of common consequences.
A2- In the TDSC model, a randomization over alternatives in a menu does not aﬀect
choice from the menu because such randomization does not change the most tempting op-
tion in the menu and because choice from menu is rationalized by a linear menu-dependent
utility as given by (9). On the other hand, in the Convex Self-Control model, some ran-
domization may aﬀect choice from the menu because the ex post utility in the model is
concave in lotteries. For example, the convex agent (13) chooses a lottery µ over a lottery η
in {µ,η}, while µαη may be chosen from {µ,µαη,η} for some α ∈ (0,1) when ϕ is strictly
15The notion of convex self-control costs and its application to the Allais paradox was independently
conceived by Takeoka [34] and Fudenberg-Levine [16] but the working paper of Fudenberg-Levine [16]
appeared ﬁrst.
23convex. Intuitively, this is because the mixed option µαη may be a good compromise for the
conﬂict between normative and temptation utilities. This diﬀerence in choice from menus
implies a diﬀerence in choice over menus. The TDSC model satisﬁes the Indiﬀerence to
Randomization axiom given by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini [10] requiring that the agent
is indiﬀerent to a menu and its convex hull, whereas a menu is less preferred to its convex
hull in the Convex Self-Control model.
Comparison with Fudenberg-Levine [16, 17]: The dual-self model of Fudenberg-











There are two diﬀerences from the General Self-Control representation (5), and thus from
the TDSC and Convex Self-Control models. First, in the General Self-Control representa-
tion, the normative self has his own identity in the sense that his preference is potentially
distinct from that of the temptation self, while in the dual-self model the long-run self only
wishes to maximize the discounted expected utility of all short-run selves. This corresponds
to the restriction u = v.16 Second, the authors explicitly study dynamic optimization in
the dual-self model, while the axiomatic literature arising from GP has focussed only on the
preference structure. In the ‘bank-nightclub’ speciﬁcation of the dual-self model, the long-
run self chooses how much cash to make available in a mental account to each short-run
self, and each short-run self in turn decides how much of it to save.
Specializing to the case where self-control costs are convex, the authors observe that
the dual-self model exhibits several of the behaviors that we are able to accommodate.
In addition, the model can accommodate Rabin’s paradox: winnings from small-stakes
lotteries are completely consumed but those from large-stakes lotteries may be saved, and
the smoothing consequently reduces risk aversion.17 The diﬀerences from the TDSC model
is in the following:
B1- While the Convex Self-Control model cannot accommodate the Common Con-
sequence Eﬀect, the dual-self model can give rise to it despite the fact that both models are
identical in basic structure. It arises because a short-run self will be tempted to consume
all the winnings of a lottery but may nevertheless save part of the winnings of a lottery, and
such intertemporal eﬀects coupled with convex self-control costs may produce the Common
Consequence Eﬀect (the authors also assume that the lotteries are unanticipated). Since
the underlying preference structure does not exhibit the Eﬀect, the dual-self model pre-
sumably gives rise to it under special conditions. In contrast, the Eﬀect is a feature of the
preference structure of the TDSC model when v is more risk averse than u, and the model
gives rise to it everytime the inequalities (10)-(11) are satisﬁed.18
16Indeed, in a static setup, WFL(x) = maxµ2x u(µ).
17The authors also consider evidence on the eﬀect of cognitive load on self-control. This can be incorpo-
rated in the TDSC model by requiring ψ to be an increasing function of cognitive load.
18Observe that since ψ is increasing, the inequalities are harder to satisfy as stakes become small (choice
24B2- In the dual-self model, the risk preferences of the long-run and short-run selves
are aligned, that is, u = v. Thus, the model cannot accommodate some of the ﬁnds on risk
aversion that the TDSC model can explain. For instance, the ﬁnding that risk aversion
tends to increase with an upcoming moment of truth would not arise for anticipated future
lotteries. Some of the predictions for risk aversion arising from intertemporal eﬀects run
counter to the evidence. For instance, as noted above, their accommodation of Rabin’s
paradox comes from the fact that the model implies a reduction in risk aversion as stake
size exceeds a threshold, whereas the evidence reveals that risk aversion tends to increase
with stake size.
7 Concluding Comments
A general framework for thinking about menu-dependent self-control is the following Menu-










, x ∈ Z,
where the weighting function κ : Z → R+ controls the nature of the menu-dependence.19
We conclude this paper with some examples of sources of menu-dependence that can po-
tentially be studied in this framework.
Example 1 (Guilt) An agent who is experiencing temptation when choosing from a
menu may be less inclined to submit to temptation when normatively superior alternatives
are available to him – the presence of such alternatives may invoke guilt or dampen the
aﬀect of temptation, and thus push him away from the tempting item. Thus self-control
may be greater in the presence of alternatives that are high in the normative ranking. Such






, x ∈ Z,
is increasingly governed by u when temptation becomes small). This would account for the fact that the
Common Consequence Eﬀect becomes harder to ﬁnd when stakes are small, though there is evidence of its
existence (see the references in [17]). In contrast, the dual-self model implies nonexistence of the Eﬀect for
small stakes lotteries.













, x ∈ Z,
where u,v : ∆ → R are continuous linear functions representing normative and temptation preference
respectively, and κ : Z → R+ ∪{∞} is a lower semicontinuous function. When κ(x) = ∞ then W(x) takes
the Strotz form where there is no self-control:
W(x) = max
µ2arg maxη2x v(η)
u(µ), x ∈ Z.
25for some decreasing f : R → R+.
Example 2 (Triggered Self-Control) Motivated by studies in cognitive neuroscience,
Benhabib and Bisin [7] provide a model in which self-control is exerted only when, in some
sense, the negative impact of temptation exceeds a certain threshold. This can be captured
by an MDSC model where κ(x) jumps down from ∞ to some ﬁnite k only when the nor-
mative opportunity cost of submitting to temptation exceeds a threshold. For instance, for
some ξ > 0,
κ(x) =
{
∞ if maxµ2x u(µ) − maxη2argmaxx v u(η) < ξ,
k otherwise. , x ∈ Z.
Example 3 (Cognitive Load and Choice) Studies in psychology have revealed that
the degree of self-control that an agent has may depend on the cognitive load that he has
experienced prior to making the choice. For instance, Ward and Mann [35] showed that
subjects who were identiﬁed as “restrained eaters” prior to the experiment were observed
to exhibit less self-control after a cognitively demanding task. The intuition behind such
observations may apply to the process of making a choice itself – making a choice may
be cognitively demanding. Indeed, if choice from larger menus is associated with greater
cognitive load, then self-control may depend on the size of a menu. Such a model is obtained
if κ(·) is an increasing function of the cardinality of a menu, or more generally, monotone
with respect to set inclusion.
A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
If there is no µ,η s.t. {µ}   {µ,η}, then the Theorem holds with any constant function v.
Henceforth assume that:
Axiom 18 (Nondegeneracy) There exists µ,η s.t. {µ}   {µ,η}.
Given the compact metric space X, consider the space ca(X) of ﬁnite Borel signed
measures on X, normed by the total variation norm. Note that
ca(X) := span(∆).
Denote the space of continuous functions on X by C(X). Since X is compact, ca(X) is
isometrically isomorphic to C(X)¤, the topological dual of (ie, the space of continuous linear
functionals on) C(X) normed by the sup-norm (Aliprantis and Border, Corollary 13.15).
Given this duality, the weak¤ topology σ(C(X)¤,C(X)) on ca(X) induces the topology of
weak convergence on ∆. Thus, when v : ca(X) → R is w¤-continuous linear function, the
restriction v|∆ is continuous in the appropriate sense. The space ca(X) is a locally convex
Hausdorﬀ topological linear space under the weak¤ topology.
26Begin with some notation: say that
• µ <T η if {µ} ∼ {µ,η}   {η},
• µ  T η if {η}   {η,µ},
• µ BT η if {µ} ∼ {η} and there exists µ1 <T η1 and µ2  T η2 and γ ∈ (0,1) s.t.
µ = µ1γµ2 and η = η1γη2.
Say that µ tempts η if µ <T η or µ  T η and consider:
Axiom 19 (Strong Temptation Convexity) For any µ,η,µ0,η0 and α ∈ (0,1), if µ tempts
η and µ0 tempts η0 then ηαη0 does not tempt µαµ0.
The following lemma allows us to adopt this stronger axiom in place of Temptation
Convexity.
Lemma 1 A preference % that satisﬁes Temptation Independence satisﬁes Strong Temp-
tation Convexity iﬀ it satisﬁes Temptation Convexity.
Proof. The ‘only if’ part is immediate. To prove the ‘if’ part, suppose Temptation
Convexity is satisﬁed.
Case (a): {µ}   {µ,η} and {µ0}   {µ0,η0}.
Take any α ∈ (0,1). By Temptation Independence,
{µαµ
0}   {µαµ
0,ηαµ
0} and {µαµ
0}   {µαµ
0,µαη
0}














































and by Temptation Independence, {µαµ0}   {µαµ0,ηαη0}, as desired.
Case (b): {µ} ∼ {µ,η}   {η} and {µ0} ∼ {µ0,η0}   {η0}.
Same argument as in the previous case.
Case (c): {η}   {η,µ} and {µ0} ∼ {µ0,η0}   {η0}.
Take any α ∈ (0,1). The result holds trivially if {µαµ0} ∼ {ηαη0}. So ﬁrst let {µαµ0}  
{ηαη0} and suppose by way of contradiction that
{µαµ
0}   {µαµ
0,ηαη
0}.
By Temptation Independence, {η}   {η,µ} implies {ηαη0}   {ηαη0,µαη0}. By our

















and by Temptation Independence, {µαµ0}   {µαµ0,µαη0} and in particular, {µ0}  
{µ0,η0}, a contradiction.




0}   {µαµ
0}.
By Temptation and Commitment Independence, {µ0} ∼ {µ0,η0}   {η0} implies {ηαµ0} ∼






















and by Temptation Independence, {ηαµ0} ∼ {ηαµ0,µαµ0}   {µαµ0} and {η} ∼ {η,µ}  
{µ}, a contradiction.
Deﬁne the set:
T0 = {λ(µ − η) : λ > 0 and µ <T η or µ  T η or µ BT η}.
Lemma 2 For any µ,η ∈ ∆ and λ > 0 such that {µ}  ∼ {η},
λ(µ − η) ∈ T0 ⇐⇒ µ <T η or µ  T η.
Proof. The ‘if’ part follows by deﬁnition. For the only if part, take any λ(µ − η) ∈ T0
and note that by deﬁnition, there exists µ0,η0 ∈ ∆ and λ0 > 0 s.t. λ(µ − η) = λ0(µ0 − η0)
and µ0 <T η0 or µ0  T η0 or µ0 BT η0. If µ0 <T η0 holds, then by Temptation Independence
applied twice we have
λ














and thus µ <T η. A similar argument implies that if µ0  T η0 then µ  T η.
Finally, we show that µ0 BT η0 is not. If it is, then by deﬁnition {µ0} ∼ {η0}, and in a
fashion analogous to the above argument, Commitment Independence applied twice yields
{µ} ∼ {η}, contradicting the assumption that {µ}  ∼ {η}.
Deﬁne:
T = cl(T0),
where cl(T0) is the closure of T0 in the weak¤ topology. Say that T is a cone if λT ⊂ T for
all λ ≥ 0.
Lemma 3 T is a weak¤ closed convex cone.
Proof. To see that T is a cone, take any ν ∈ T and any net να
w¤
→ ν where να ∈ T0. For any
λ > 0, we have λνα ∈ T0 (by deﬁnition of T0) and λνα
w¤
→ λν and thus λν ∈ T . To see that
0 ∈ T observe that by nondegeneracy there exists µ,η s.t. {η}   {η,µ} and by Temptation
28Independence {η}α{µ}   {η,µ}α{µ} for all α. Consequently, α(µ − η) = (µ − ηαµ) ∈ T0
for all α and therefore 0 ∈ T .
Since the closure of a convex set is convex, in order to prove that T is convex it suﬃces
to show that T0 is convex. We show that T0 = co(T1), where:
T1 = {λ(µ − η) : λ > 0 and µ <T η or µ  T η}.
It follows immediately from deﬁnitions that T0 ⊂ co(T1). For the converse, take any
ν ∈ co(T1). Then there exist λi(µi−ηi) ∈ T1 and weights αi, i = 1,..,N, such that µi <T ηi
for i = 1,..,n and µi  T ηi for i = n + 1,..,N, and
N ∑
i=1
αiλi(µi − ηi) = ν.

































































i=1 αiλi ∈ [0,1]. By Strong Temptation Convexity and by deﬁnition of BT,
either µγ1µ0 <T ηγ1η0 or µγ1µ0  T ηγ1η0 or µγ1µ0 BT ηγ1η0 hold. Therefore ν ∈ T0. This
completes the proof.
Lemma 4 If ν ∈ T then there exists a norm-bounded net να
w¤
→ ν s.t. να ∈ T0.
Proof. Since X is compact, C(X) is separable and ca(X) is isometrically isomorphic to
the topological dual C(X)¤. Thus T is a weak¤ closed convex set in the dual of a separable
normed space. By the Krein-Smulian theorem [28, Cor 2.7.13], T is sequentially weak¤
closed. In particular, T is the sequential weak¤ closure of T0. Thus, for any ν ∈ T there
29is a sequence νn
w¤
→ ν s.t. νn ∈ T0. To conclude the proof, we observe that sequences are
norm-bounded:
By deﬁnition of weak¤ convergence, νn
w¤
→ ν implies that
∫
X f dνn →
∫
X f dν for any





     
 n = 1,2,..
}
< ∞.
By the Banach-Steinhaus theorem [28, Thm 1.6.9] there exists K < ∞ s.t.  νn  ≤ K for
each n = 1,2,... This completes the proof.
Lemma 5 If {η}   {η,µ} then η − µ  ∈ T .
Proof. Take any µ¤,η¤ such that {η¤}   {η¤,µ¤}, and suppose by way of contradiction
that ν := η¤ − µ¤ ∈ T .
Step 1: Show that there is a sequence (µn,ηn)
w¤
→ (µ,η) and λ > 0 s.t. 0  = µn−ηn ∈ T0
for each n and λ(µ − η) = ν.
As ν ∈ T , by the proof of the previous lemma there exists a sequence νn
w¤
→ ν where
νn ∈ T0 and there is K < ∞ s.t.
 νn  ≤ K, n = 1,2,... (14)
Since ν = η¤ − µ¤  = 0, we can assume wlog that νn  = 0 for all n. By the Jordan
decomposition theorem, νn = σ1
n −σ2
n for two mutually singular positive measures σ1
n,σ2
n ∈
ca(X). Since νn  = 0 and νn(X) = 0,20 we see that σ1
n+σ2
n  = 0, σ1
n  = σ2
n and λn := σ1
n(X) =
σ2
n(X) > 0. Consequently, we can write
νn = λn(µn − ηn),
for two mutually singular µn,ηn ∈ ∆ and λn > 0. By mutual singularity  µn − ηn  = 2.
But then
 νn  =  λn(µn − ηn)  = λn (µn − ηn)  = 2λn.
By (14), λn is a real sequence in the compact interval [0, K
2 ]. Passing to a subsequence
if necessary, we assume wlog that this sequence converges. Moreover, since ∆ is a weak¤
compact subset of ca(X), both µn and ηn have weak¤ convergent subsequences. Wlog we






νn = λn(µn − ηn)
w¤
→ λ(µ − η).
20To see why νn(X) = 0, note that since each σ ∈ T0 takes the form λ(µ − η), it must be that σ(X) =
λ(µ(X) − η(X)) = λ(1 − 1) = 0 for each such σ. Since any σ ∈ T is a limit of measures in T0, it must be
that σ(X) = 0.
30Since νn
w¤
→ ν in a Hausdorﬀ space, ν = λ(µ−η). Moreover, νn ∈ T0 implies (µn−ηn) =
1
λnνn ∈ T0. This completes the step.
Step 2: Prove the result.
Consider the sequences µn
w¤
→ µ and ηn
w¤
→ η constructed in step 1. First observe that
since λ(µ − η) = ν = η¤ − µ¤ and µ¤  T η¤, arguing as in the proof of Lemma 2 implies
η  T µ, that is, {µ}   {µ,η}. But since µn
w¤
→ µ and ηn
w¤
→ η, Semi-Continuity implies
that for all large n, {µn}   {µn,ηn}.21 But by Lemma 2 this contradicts the fact that
µn − ηn ∈ T0 for all n.
Lemma 6 There exists a temptation utility. That is, there exists a weak¤ continuous linear
v s.t. for all µ,η ∈ ∆,
{η}   {η,µ} =⇒ v(µ) > v(η)
{µ} ∼ {µ,η}   {η} =⇒ v(µ) ≥ v(η).
Proof. Consider the set
S = {w ∈ ca(X)
¤ : w(T ) ≥ 0 and w(T )  = 0}.
That is, S is the set of nonzero weak¤ continuous linear functionals on ca(X) that take
positive values for each ν ∈ T and a strictly positive value for some ν ∈ T .
Step 1: S is nonempty.
By nondegeneracy, there is µ,η s.t. {η}   {η,µ}, and by the previous lemma, η−µ  ∈ T .
Since {η − µ} is compact and T weak¤ closed and both are convex and disjoint, by a
separating hyperplane theorem [28, Thm 2.2.28] there is a nonzero weak¤ continuous linear
functional w such that
inf{w(ν) : ν ∈ T } > w(η − µ). (15)
We claim that the inf is achieved at exactly 0. Given that 0 ∈ T and w(0) = 0, suppose there
is ν0 ∈ T s.t. w(ν0) < 0. Since T is a cone and w is linear, kν0 ∈ T and w(kν0) = kw(ν0) for
each k > 0. But by selecting a large enough k it would follow that the inﬁmum violates
(15), a contradiction. Therefore the inﬁmum is achieved at 0, and for each ν ∈ T ,
w(ν) ≥ 0 > w(η − µ).
Indeed, w ∈ S.
21The proof is as follows. First use Semi-Continuity and Binary Set-Betweenness to show that for any
binary menu x there is a singleton equivalent: {ex} ∼ x. Note that by Binary Set-Betweenness, x is
bounded above and below by singleton menus, and thus also by the u-best and u-worst alternatives µ¤ and
µ¤ in ∆. By Semi-Continuity the sets {α : {µ¤αµ¤} % x} and {α : {µ¤αµ¤} - x} are closed subsets of [0,1].
Given Order, connectedness of [0,1] implies that the two sets have a nonempty intersection. Now prove
the result: Since {µ}   {efµ,ηg} ∼ {µ,η}, Commitment Independence implies {µ}   {µ1
2efµ,ηg}   {µ,η}.
Then Semi-Continuity implies that {µn}   {µn,ηn} for all large n.
31Step 2: Any v ∈ S serves as a temptation utility.
By deﬁnition of S, we see that {η}   {η,µ} or {µ} ∼ {µ,η}   {η} implies v(µ) ≥ v(η)
for each v ∈ S. We need to show that {η}   {η,µ} must imply v(µ) > v(η) for any such v.
Suppose it does not. Then there exists µ,η and v such that {η}   {η,µ} and v(µ) = v(η).
But by step 1, there exists µ0,η0 s.t. v(µ0) < v(η0). By Semi-Continuity, for large enough
α it must be that {ηαη0}   {ηαη0,µαµ0}, and thus µαµ0 − ηαη0 ∈ T . But by linearity it
must also be that v(µαµ0 − ηαη0) < 0, contradicting the fact that v ∈ S. This concludes
the proof.
Lemma 7 v|∆ is unique up to a positive aﬃne transformation.
Proof. Suppose v,v0 are two temptation representations and there exists µ,η ∈ ∆ s.t.
v(µ) ≥ v(η) and v0(µ) < v0(η). If {µ}   {η}, by Binary Set Betweenness, we have either
{µ}   {µ,η} or {µ} ∼ {µ,η}   {η}. Since v and v0 are temptation utility functions, the
former implies v(η) > v(µ) and v0(η) > v0(µ), while the latter implies v(µ) ≥ v(η) and
v0(µ) ≥ v0(η), which contradicts the hypothesis. Similarly, we have a contradiction when
{η}   {µ}. Thus, we must have {µ} ∼ {η}.
By nondegeneracy, there is µ0,η0 s.t. {η0}   {η0,µ0}. The temptation representations
must satisfy v(µ0) > v(η0) and v0(µ0) > v0(η0). For small enough α, v(µ0αµ) > v(η0αη) and
v0(µ0αµ) < v0(η0αη). On the other hand, since {η0}   {µ0} and {η} ∼ {µ}, by Commitment
Independence, {η0αη}   {µ0αµ} for all α ∈ (0,1). Thus, by Binary Set Betweenness,
either {η0αη}   {η0αη,µ0αµ} or {η0αη} ∼ {η0αη,µ0αµ}   {µ0αµ}. The former contradicts
v0(µ0αµ) < v0(η0αη), and the latter contradicts v(µ0αµ) > v(η0αη). It follows that v,v0 are
ordinally equivalent on ∆ and therefore by linearity they are cardinally equivalent on ∆.
B Appendix: Proofs of Thm 3 and Cor 1
Abbreviate Partial Mixture Linearity and Binary Independence as PML and BI respectively.
Consider the following axiom.
Axiom 20 (Strong PML) For any µi,ηi ∈ ∆, i = 1,2, and any α ∈ (0,1),
{µi}   {µi,ηi}   {ηi}, i = 1,2 =⇒ {µ1αµ2,η1αη2} ∼ α{eµ1η1} + (1 − α){eµ2η2}.
Lemma 8 PML and BI imply Strong PML.
Proof. Take µi,ηi, i = 1,2, as in Strong PML. By BI,








(α{eµ1η1} + (1 − α){η2}) +
1
2
(α{η1} + (1 − α){eµ2η2}),







(α{eµ1η1} + (1 − α){eµ2η2}) +
1
2
(α{η1} + (1 − α){η2}).
By BI it must be that
{µ1αµ2,η1αη2} ∼ α{eµ1η1} + (1 − α){eµ2η2},
as desired.
Lemma 9 If a basic preference % satisﬁes PML and BI, then there do not exist s,m,l s.t.
l %T m %T s and
{s,m}   {m} and {m,l}   {s,l}.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exist such s,m,l. Consider the following
steps.
Step 1: Show that
{s}   {s,m}   {m} and {m}   {m,l}   {s,l} % {l}.
Begin by noting that by Binary Set-Betweenness and m %T s, both {s}   {s,m} and
{s}   {m} must hold. Also, it cannot be that {l} % {s}. Since {l} % {s}   {m} and
l %T m, we have {l} ∼ {m,l}, and moreover, {l} % {s} and acyclicity of %T implies
{l} ∼ {s,l}. But then {s,l} ∼ {l} ∼ {m,l}, contradicting the hypothesis. Therefore
{s}   {l} and in particular, {s}   {s,l} % {l}. Note also that {m,l}   {s,l} % {l}
implies {m,l}   {l}, and so given Binary Set-Betweenness, l %T m implies {m}   {m,l}.
This completes the step.
Step 2: Show that {s,l}   {l}.
Note that by Step 1 and Strong PML,
{s}   {s,m}   {m} and {m}   {m,l}   {l},
=⇒ {s1
2m,m1




2m}   {l1
2m}
=⇒ {s,l}   {l} by BI.
Step 3: Show that there is α s.t. {sαl}   {sαl,m}   {m}, and moreover,
{sαl}   {sαl,mαl}   {mαl}, {mαl}   {mαl,l}   {l} and {sαl}   {sαl,l}   {l}.
The displayed preferences follow from BI. The existence of α follows from Continuity:
note that if {sαl}    {sαl,m} as α → 1 then Continuity implies {s}    {s,m}, a contradic-
tion. Similarly it cannot be that {sαl,m}    {m} as α → 1. Therefore there is a desired α
close to 1.
Step 4: Prove the result.
33Letting (µ1,η1) = (sαl,m) and (µ2,η2) = (mαl,l), observe that by Step 3 and Strong
PML,
α{sαl,mαl} + (1 − α){mαl} = {(sαl)α(mαl),mαl} ∼ {αefsαl,mg + (1 − α)efmαl,lg}.
Similarly, letting (µ1,η1) = (sαl,m) and (µ2,η2) = (sαl,l) we have
{sαl,mαl} ∼ {αefsαl,mg + (1 − α)efsαl,lg}.
But by hypothesis, {m,l}   {s,l}, which implies {mαl,l}   {sαl,l} by BI. Therefore,
{efmαl,lg}   {efsαl,lg}, and in turn,
{αefsαl,mg + (1 − α)efmαl,lg}   {αefsαl,mg + (1 − α)efsαl,lg}
=⇒ α{sαl,mαl} + (1 − α){mαl}   {sαl,mαl}
=⇒ {αefsαl,mαlg + (1 − α)efmαlg}   {αefsαl,mαlg + (1 − α)efsαl,mαlg} by BI
=⇒ {efmαlg}   {efsαl,mαlg} by Commitment Independence
=⇒ {mαl}   {sαl,mαl}
=⇒ {m}   {s,m} by BI. But this contradicts the hypothesis that {s,m}   {m}.
Lemma 10 If a basic preference % satisﬁes Set-Betweenness, PML and BI, then there
does not exist a temptation-driven WARP violation.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a temptation-driven WARP violation,
that is, there exists s,m,l s.t. l %T m %T s and
{s,m}   {m} and {s,m,l}   {s,l}.
It must be that {m,l} % {s,m,l}   {s,l}, since {s,m,l}   {m,l},{s,l} and Set-
Betweenness yields {s,m,l}   {s,m,l} a contradiction. But then
{s,m}   {m} and {m,l}   {s,l},
which is excluded by PML and BI, as shown in the previous result.
C Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4
C.1 Preliminary Lemmas
Lemma 11 (i) There exists a continuous linear function u : ∆ → R+ such that
{µ} % {η} ⇐⇒ u(µ) ≥ u(η)
(ii) There exists a continuous function W : Z → R+ that represents % and satisﬁes
W({µ}) = u(µ) for all µ ∈ ∆.
(iii) There exists a continuous linear function v : ∆ → R+ such that if {µ}   {η} then
{µ}   {µ,η} ⇐⇒ v(η) > v(µ).
34Proof. (i) The ﬁrst assertion follows from Order, Continuity, Commitment Independence,
and the mixture space theorem.
(ii) Since u is continuous on ∆, there exist a maximal and a minimal lottery µ∆,µ∆ ∈ ∆
with respect to u. Without loss of generality, we can assume u(µ∆) = 1 and u(µ∆) = 0.
From Continuity and Set Betweenness, {µ∆} % x % {µ∆} for all x ∈ Z. By a standard argu-




Then W represents %. Moreover, W({µ}) = u(µ) for all µ ∈ ∆.
To show continuity of W, let xn → x. Since u(µ∆) = 1 and u(µ∆) = 0, W(x) = α(x).
So we want to show α(xn) → α(x). By contradiction, suppose otherwise. Then, there exists
a neighborhood B(α(x)) of α(x) such that α(xm) / ∈ B(α(x)) for inﬁnitely many m. Let
{xm} denote the corresponding subsequence of {xn}. Since xn → x, {xm} also converges to
x. Since {α(xm)} is a sequence in [0,1], there exists a convergent subsequence {α(x )} with
a limit α  = α(x). On the other hand, since x  → x and x  ∼ {µ∆α(x )µ∆}, Continuity
implies x ∼ {µ∆αµ∆}. Since α(x) is unique, α(x) = α, which is a contradiction.
(iii) By Theorem 2.
Without loss of generality, assume that v(∆) = [0,1]. By construction, if {µ}   {µ,η},
then v(η) > v(µ). If {µ} ∼ {µ,η}   {η}, then v(µ) ≥ v(η).
Lemma 12 For all ν,ν0, if v(ν) > v(ν0) and u(ν)  = u(ν0), then ν %T ν0.
Proof. If u(ν0) > u(ν), by construction of v, we have {ν0}   {ν,ν0}. Thus ν %T ν0. If
u(ν) > u(ν0), Set Betweenness implies {ν} % {ν,ν0} % {ν0}. If {ν}   {ν,ν0}, we have
v(ν0) > v(ν), which contradicts the assumption. Thus we must have {ν} ∼ {ν,ν0}   {ν0}.
Thus ν %T ν0.
Lemma 13 Assume that µ,η,η0 satisfy {µ}   {µ,η}   {η} and v(η) ≥ v(η0). Then, for
all α ∈ (0,1),
(i) {µαη0,ηαη0} % {eµηαη0},
(ii) {µαη0}   {µαη0,ηαη0}   {ηαη0}.
Proof. (i) Step 1: If v(η) > v(η0), then the claim holds. If {η0}  ∼ {η}, by Lemma 12, η %T
η0. Since {µ,η}α{η} ∼ {eµηαη} by Linear Self-Control, the result is implied by Decreasing
Self-Control. Suppose instead that {η0} ∼ {η}. Since u(µ) > u(η), for all β ∈ (0,1) close to
zero, {µβη0}   {η} and v(µβη0) < v(η) and thus, {µβη0}   {µβη0,η}. That is, η %T µβη0.
Linear Self-Control and Decreasing Self-Control imply that {µ,η}α{µβη0} % {eµηα(µβη0)},
and by Continuity, the desired result holds as β → 0.
Step 2: When v(η) = v(η0), the claim holds. Let η+ and η¡ be a maximal and a minimal
lottery with respect to v. If v(η0) > v(η¡), v(η) > v(η0βη¡) for all β ∈ (0,1). By Step
1, {µα(η0βη¡),ηα(η0βη¡)} % {eµηα(η0βη¡)}. By Continuity, {µαη0,ηαη0} % {eµηαη0} as
β → 1.
35If v(η0) = v(η¡), v(ηβη+) > v(η0), and, by Continuity, {µ}   {µ,ηβη+}   {ηβη+}
for all β ∈ (0,1) suﬃciently close to one. By Step 1, {µαη0,(ηβη+)αη0} % {efµ,ηβη+gαη0}.




Thus, we have {µαη0,(ηβη+)αη0} % {(µ∆α({µ,ηβη+})µ∆)αη0}. Since α(x) is continuous







as β → 1.
(ii) By Commitment Independence, Temptation Independence and part (i), {µ}  
{µ,η}   {η}
=⇒ {µ}   {eµη}   {η}
=⇒ {µαη0}   {eµηαη0}   {ηαη0}
=⇒ {µαη0}   {µαη0,ηαη0} % {eµηαη0}   {ηαη0}
=⇒ {µαη0}   {µαη0,ηαη0}   {ηαη0}.
Lemma 14 For all α ∈ (0,1),
{µ}   {µ,η}   {η}, {µ
0}   {µ
0,η}   {η} =⇒ {µαµ
0}   {µαµ
0,η}   {η}.
Proof. Assume the hypothesis. Let x = α{µ,η} + (1 − α){µ0,η}. By [18, Lemma 2],
there are lotteries a¤,b¤ ∈ x s.t {a¤,b¤} ∼ x and (a¤,b¤) solves maxa2x minb2x W({a,b})
and (b¤,a¤) solves minb2x maxa2x W({a,b}).
Step 1: Show that x ∼ {µαµ0,η}.
We prove that (a¤,b¤) = (µαµ0,η). Observe that by Commitment Independence, Linear
Self-Control and Decreasing Self-Control,
α{µ} + (1 − α){µ
0,η} % α{µ} + (1 − α){eµ0η}   x   α{η} + (1 − α){eµ0η}
∼ α{η} + (1 − α){µ
0,η},
α{µ,η} + (1 − α){µ
0} % α{eµη} + (1 − α){µ
0}   x   α{eµη} + (1 − α){η}
∼ α{µ,η} + (1 − α){η},
Therefore x can be indiﬀerent only to {µαη},{ηαµ0},{µαµ0,η} or {µαη,ηαµ0}. To rule
out the latter, suppose (µαη,ηαµ0) solves the maxmin problem. Then
x ∼ {µαη,ηαµ
0} - {µαη,η} ∼ α{eµη} + (1 − α){η} ≺ α{eµη} + (1 − α){eµ0η} ∼ x,
a contradiction. Similarly, if (ηαµ0,µαη) solves the maxmin problem, then
x ∼ {ηαµ
0,µαη} - {ηαµ
0,η} ∼ α{η} + (1 − α){eµ0η} ≺ α{eµη} + (1 − α){eµ0η} ∼ x,
36a contradiction. Thus x  ∼ {µαη,ηαµ0}. An entirely similar argument establishes that x is
not indiﬀerent to {µαη} or {ηαµ0}. Conclude that x ∼ {µαµ0,η}.
Step 2: Prove the result.
Observe that by Commitment Independence and Linear Self-Control,
x = α{µ,η} + (1 − α){µ
0,η} ∼ α{eµη} + (1 − α){eµ0η}.
Applying Step 1 and Commitment Independence proves the result.
Lemma 15 If v(η) = v(η0), for all α ∈ (0,1),
{µ}   {µ,η}   {η} ,{µ
0}   {µ
0,η
0}   {η
0} =⇒ {µαµ
0}   {µαµ
0,ηαη
0}   {ηαη
0}.
Proof. As a preliminary, we ﬁrst show the following claim: For all µ,η and α ∈ (0,1), if
{µαη}   {µαη,η}   {η}, then {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}. Since {µαη}   {µαη,η}, we have
v(η) > v(µαη). Since v is mixture linear, v(η) > v(µ). Moreover, mixture linearity of u
implies u(µ) > u(η). Hence, {µ}   {µ,η}. By Linear Self-Control and the assumption,
{µαη,η} ∼ {eµηαη}   {η}. Hence, we have {µ,η} ∼ {eµη}   {η}, as desired.
Next we show the result. By Lemma 13 (ii), {µαη0}   {µαη0,ηαη0}   {ηαη0} and




























0}   {ηαη
0}.
By the ﬁrst claim, {µαµ0}   {µαµ0,ηαη0}   {ηαη0}.
C.2 Construction of ψ on the Self-Control Subdomain
Deﬁne the self-control subdomain as
A ≡ {(l,w) ∈ [0,1]
2 : ∃µ,η s.t.v(η) = l,v(η) − v(µ) = w and{µ}   {µ,η}   {η}}.
Let
LA ≡ {l ∈ [0,1]|(l,w) ∈ A for some w},
A(l) ≡ {w|(l,w) ∈ A}.
If l ∈ LA, A(l)  = ∅, and, by deﬁnition, supA(l) ≤ l.
37Lemma 16 (i) If (l,w) ∈ A, (αl,αw) ∈ A for all α ∈ (0,1).
(ii) LA is a non-degenerate interval with inf LA = 0.
(iii) For all l ∈ LA, A(l) is a non-degenerate interval with inf A(l) = 0.
(iv) If supA(l) < l, A(l) is open.
(v) If supA(l) ∈ A(l), supA(l) = l.
Proof. (i) Take (l,w) ∈ A. There exist µ,η such that {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}, l = v(η), w =
v(η)−v(µ). Let ν¡ be a minimal lottery with respect to v. Since v(η) = l > 0 = v(ν¡), by
Lemma 13 (ii), {µαν¡}   {µαν¡,ηαν¡}   {ηαν¡} for all α ∈ (0,1). Since αl = v(ηαν¡)
and αw = v(ηαν¡) − v(µαν¡), (αl,αw) ∈ A as desired.
(ii) Take any l ∈ LA. There exists w such that (l,w) ∈ A. By part (i), (αl,αw) ∈ A for
all α ∈ (0,1). Hence, αl ∈ LA as desired.
(iii) Take any w ∈ A(l). It suﬃces to show that αw ∈ A for all α ∈ (0,1). There exist
µ,η such that {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}, l = v(η) and w = v(η) − v(µ). By Lemma 13 (ii),
{µαη}   {µαη,η}   {η}. Moreover, αw = v(η) − v(µαη). Hence, αw ∈ A(l).
(iv) Since A(l) is an interval such that 0 / ∈ A(l) and inf A(l) = 0, it is enough to
show that for all w ∈ A(l), there exists w0 > w such that w0 ∈ A(l). There exist µ,η
such that {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}, v(η) = l and v(η) − v(µ) = w. Continuity implies that
there exists an open neighborhood B(µ) of µ such that {µ0}   {µ0,η}   {η} for all
µ0 ∈ B(µ). Since w ≤ supA(l) < l, we have v(µ) = l − w > 0 = min∆ v. Let ν¡ satisfy
v(ν¡) = min∆ v. Since v(µ) > v(ν¡), v(η) > v(µαν¡) and µαν¡ ∈ B(µ) for all α close to
1. Thus w < v(η) − v(µαν¡) ∈ A(l) as desired.
(v) By deﬁnition, supA(l) ≤ l. Suppose supA(l) < l. By part (iv), A(l) is open.
Since supA(l) ∈ A(l), there exists a small ε > 0 such that supA(l) + ε ∈ A(l), which is a
contradiction.
Deﬁne ϕ : A → (0,1] by
ϕ(l,w) := u(µ) − W({µ,η}),
s.t. µ,η ∈ ∆ satisfy v(η) = l, v(η) − v(µ) = w and {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}. The following
lemmas ensure that ϕ is well-deﬁned.






     









     






For all µ ∈ ∆(N,c) and θ ∈ Θ(N,c), if µ + θ ∈ ∆(N,c), we can view µ + θ as the lottery
obtained by shifting µ toward θ. For all µ ∈ ∆(N,c), say that θ ∈ Θ(N,c) is admissible for
µ if µ + θ ∈ ∆(N,c). Moreover, θ ∈ Θ(N,c) is said to be strictly admissible for µ if µ + θ
belongs to the interior of ∆(N,c).





38Lemma 17 Assume that {µ,η} ∼ {ν} and θ ∈ Θ(N,c) is admissible for µ,η,ν. Then,
v(θ) < 0 =⇒ {µ,η} + θ % {ν} + θ,
v(θ) > 0 =⇒ {ν} + θ % {µ,η} + θ.
Proof. We follow the proof of Ergin and Sarver [14, Lemma 6]. As in their proof, let
A ≡ {µ,η} and B ≡ {ν}. As shown in their proof, there exist p,q ∈ ∆(N,c) and 0 < κ ≤ 1
such that θ = κ(p − q). Deﬁne menus A0 and B0 as in their proof. Then, by deﬁnition,
qκA0 = A, qκB0 = B, pκA0 = A + θ, and pκB0 = B + θ.
First assume v(θ) < 0. Then, v(q) > v(p). If {p}  ∼ {q}, by Lemma 12, q %T p. Thus,
by Decreasing Self-Control, qκA0 = A ∼ B = qκB0 implies
A + θ = pκA
0 % pκB
0 = B + θ,
as desired. If {p} ∼ {q}, there exists r ∈ ∆ such that {pβr}  ∼ {q} for all β ∈ (0,1).
Moreover, for all β suﬃciently close to one, v(pβr) < v(q) by continuity. Hence q %T pβr
for such β. By Decreasing Self-Control, we have (pβr)κA0 % (pβr)κB0. By Continuity, we
have A + θ = pκA0 % pκB0 = B + θ as β → 1. The symmetric argument can be applied
when v(θ) > 0.
Lemma 18 Assume that {µ,η} ∼ {ν} and θ ∈ Θ(N,c) is strictly admissible for µ,η,ν.
Then,
v(θ) ≤ 0 =⇒ {µ,η} + θ % {ν} + θ,
v(θ) ≥ 0 =⇒ {ν} + θ % {µ,η} + θ.
Proof. Since µ+θ,η+θ,ν+θ belong to the interior of ∆(N,c), there exists a neighborhood
O(θ) of θ such that µ + θ0,η + θ0,ν + θ0 ∈ ∆(N,c) for all θ0 ∈ O(θ). Take any θ such that
v(θ) < 0. For all small β > 0, θβθ ∈ O(θ). Since v(θβθ) < 0, by Lemma 17,
{µ,η} + θβθ % {ν} + θβθ.
By Continuity, {µ,η}+θ % {ν}+θ as β → 0. Similarly, by taking any θ such that v(θ) > 0,
we can show that {ν} + θ % {µ,η} + θ.
Lemma 19 For all µ,µ0 ∈ ∆(N,c) and θ ∈ Θ(N,c) that is strictly admissible for µ,µ0,
W({µ,µ
0}) + u(θ) − W({µ + θ,µ
0 + θ})
{
≤ 0 if v(θ) ≤ 0
≥ 0 if v(θ) ≥ 0.
Proof. By Set Betweenness, assume that {µ} % {µ,µ0} % {µ0}. Since u is continuous,
there exists α ∈ [0,1] such that W({µ,µ0}) = u(µαµ0). Since µαµ0 + θ = (µ + θ)α(µ0 + θ),
µαµ0 + θ also belongs to the interior of ∆(N,c). If v(θ) ≤ 0, Lemma 18 implies
W({µ + θ,µ
0 + θ)}) ≥ u(µαµ
0 + θ) = u(µαµ
0) + u(θ) = W({µ,µ
0}) + u(θ).
The same argument can be applicable when v(θ) ≥ 0.
39Lemma 20 Take all µ,µ0,η,η0 ∈ ∆ with ﬁnite supports. Assume that {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}
and {µ0}   {µ0,η0}   {η0}. Then,
v(η) = v(η
0), v(µ) = v(µ




Proof. Let c ≡ {c1,··· ,cN} ⊂ C be the union of the supports of µ,µ0,η,η0. Hence, these
lotteries belong to ∆(N,c). Take a lottery ν in the interior of ∆(N,c). For all α ∈ (0,1)
suﬃciently close to one, let a ≡ µαν, b ≡ ηαν, a0 ≡ µ0αν, b0 ≡ η0αν ∈ ∆(N,c). Continuity
implies {a}   {a,b}   {b} and {a0}   {a0,b0}   {b0}. Furthermore, v(b) = αv(η) + (1 −
α)v(ν) = αv(η0)+(1−α)v(ν) = v(b0) and v(a) = αv(µ)+(1−α)v(ν) = αv(µ0)+(1−α)v(ν) =
v(a0).
Step 1: We claim that if θ ≡ a0 − a ∈ Θ(N,c) is strictly admissible for b, then u(a) −
W({a,b}) = u(a0) − W({a0,b0}). Since v is mixture linear, v(θ) = v(a0) − v(a) = 0, and
v(b + θ) = v(b) + v(θ) = v(b0). Since u(a) > W({a,b}) > u(b) and v(θ) = 0, Lemma 19
implies that
u(a + θ) = u(a) + u(θ) > W({a,b}) + u(θ) = W({a + θ,b + θ}) > u(b) + u(θ) = u(b + θ),
that is, {a+θ}   {a+θ,b+θ}   {b+θ}. Equivalently, {a0}   {a0,b+θ}   {b+θ}. Since




0}) = W({a + θ,b + θ}) = W({a,b}) + u(θ) = W({a,b}) + u(a
0) − u(a)




Since v(b) = v(b0), from Lemma 15, for all β ∈ [0,1], {aβa0}   {aβa0,bβb0}   {bβb0}.
Notice also that aβa0, bβb0 ∈ ∆(N,c) for all β ∈ [0,1].
Step 2: We claim that for all β ∈ [0,1], there exists a relative open interval O(β)
containing β such that for all ˜ β ∈ O(β),
u(a˜ βa






Since v(b) = v(b0) and v(a) = v(a0), we have, for all ˜ β ∈ [0,1], v(b˜ βb0) = v(bβb0) and
v(a˜ βa0) = v(aβa0). Let θ ≡ aβa0 − a˜ βa0 ∈ Θ(N,c). Notice that
b˜ βb
0 + θ = (η˜ βη
0)αν + (β − ˜ β)(a − a
0).
Since (ηβη0)αν is in the interior of ∆(N,c), there exists a relative open interval O(β) con-
taining β such that (η˜ βη0)αν + (β − ˜ β)(a − a0) ∈ ∆(N,c) for all ˜ β ∈ O(β). That is, for all
˜ β ∈ O(β), θ is strictly admissible for b˜ βb0. Thus, by Step 1, we have (16).
Step 3: We claim that u(a) − W({a,b}) = u(a0) − W({a0,b0}). Let O(β) be an open
interval containing β ∈ [0,1] guaranteed by Step 2. Since {O(β)|β ∈ [0,1]} is an open
cover of [0,1], there exists a ﬁnite subcover, denoted by {O(βi)|i = 1,··· ,I}. Without
40loss of generality, assume βi ≤ βi+1. Deﬁne β0 = 0 and βI+1 = 1. Since β0 ∈ O(β1) and

















0}) = u(a) − W({a,b}).
From Step 3, for all α ∈ (0,1) suﬃciently close to one,




Continuity ensures that u(µ) − W({µ,η}) = u(µ0) − W({µ0,η0}) as α → 1.
Lemma 21 For all µ,µ0,η,η0 ∈ ∆ such that {µ}   {µ,η}   {η} and {µ0}   {µ0,η0}  
{η0},
v(η) = v(η
0), v(µ) = v(µ




Proof. Deﬁne µn = η 1
nµ, ηn = µ 1
nη, µ0
n = η0 1
nµ0 and η0
n = µ0 1
nη0. Then, µn → µ, ηn → η,
µ0
n → µ0, and η0
n → η0. For all suﬃciently large n, by Continuity, {µn}   {µn,ηn}   {ηn}
and {µ0
n}   {µ0
n,η0
n}   {η0
n}. Moreover, v(µn) = v(µ0
n) and v(ηn) = v(η0
n).
For all suﬃciently large n, let O(µn) be the 1
n-neighborhood of µn. Since the set of
lotteries with ﬁnite supports is dense in ∆, we can ﬁnd µ+
n,µ¡
n ∈ O(µn) with ﬁnite supports
such that v(µ¡
n) < v(µn) < v(µ+
n). Deﬁne













Then, v(˜ µn) = v(µn) and ˜ µn has a ﬁnite support. Moreover, by the triangle inequality,
d(˜ µn,µ) ≤ d(˜ µn,µn) + d(µn,µ) → 0,
as n → ∞. Similarly, we can construct ˜ ηn, ˜ µ0
n, and ˜ η0
n for all suﬃciently large n. Then,
˜ µn, ˜ ηn, ˜ µ0
n, and ˜ η0
n satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 20. For all such n, we have u(˜ µn) −
W({˜ µn, ˜ ηn}) = u(˜ µ0
n)−W({˜ µ0
n, ˜ η0
n}). Continuity of u and W implies that u(µ)−W({µ,η}) =
u(µ0) − W({µ0,η0}), as desired.
Lemma 22 (i) ϕ is well-deﬁned.
(ii) For any (l,w) ∈ A and α ∈ (0,1),
ϕ(l,αw) = αϕ(l,w).
(iii) ϕ(l,·) is strictly increasing and continuous in the interior of A(l).
41Proof. (i) By Lemma 21, if µ,η,µ0,η0 ∈ ∆ and v(η) = v(η0), v(η) − v(µ) = v(η0) − v(µ0),
{µ}   {µ,η}   {η} and {µ0}   {µ0,η0}   {η0}, then in particular v(µ0) = v(µ) and
v(η0) = v(η), and thus u(µ) − W({µ,η}) = u(µ0) − W({µ0,η0}). Thus ϕ is well-deﬁned.
(ii) Take any (w,l) ∈ A and suppose µ,η are such that v(η) = l, v(η) − v(µ) = w
and {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}. Suppose {µ,η} ∼ {ν} for some ν (assured by the argument of
Lemma 11 (ii)). By Lemma 13 (ii), {µαη}   {µαη,η}   {η}. Moreover, v(η) − v(µαη) =
αw. Now observe that
u(ναη) = W({µ,η})αu(η) = u(µαη) − αϕ(l,w)
W({µαη,η}) = u(µαη) − ϕ(l,αw).
Therefore, Linear Self-Control implies the result.
(iii) First we show that ϕ(l,·) is strictly increasing. Take any two points w1,w2 in the
interior of A(l) with w1 < w2. Since A(l) is an interval, there exists ˜ w in the interior of A
such that w2 < ˜ w. Let αi ≡
wi
˜ w for i = 1,2. By part (ii),
ϕ(l,w1) = α1ϕ(l, ˜ w) < α2ϕ(l, ˜ w) = ϕ(l,w2).
Hence ϕ(l,·) is strictly increasing.
To show continuity, let wn → w in the interior of A(l). Without loss of generality,
assume that there exists ˜ w ∈ A(l) such that wn,w ≤ ˜ w for all n. Let αn = wn





nϕ(l, ˜ w) → αϕ(l, ˜ w) = ϕ(l,w)
as desired.
Lemma 23 For all (l,w) ∈ A,
ϕ(l,w) = ψ(l) · w
for some ψ(l) > 0.
Proof. Let A(l) denote the closure of A(l). By Lemma 16 (iii), A(l) is a nondegener-
ate interval containing 0; let A(l) = [0,wl]. Let ϕ(l,0) = infw2A(l) ϕ(l,w) and ϕ(l,wl) =
supw2A(l) ϕ(l,w). By Lemma 22 (ii), ϕ(l,0) = 0. By using ϕ(l,0) and ϕ(l,wl), we can
extend ϕ(l,w) to A(l). Since ϕ(l,·) is strictly increasing and continuous, this extension,
denoted by ϕ(l,·), is a unique continuous and strictly increasing extension. Given continu-
ity, the property in Lemma 22 (ii) is satisﬁed by ϕ(l,·) as well. But then for any (l,w) ∈ A,
we have ϕ(l,w) = ϕ(l,w) = ϕ(l, w
wlwl) = w
wlϕ(l,wl). Indeed, ϕ(l,w) = w · ψ(l) where
ψ(l) := 1
wlϕ(l,wl) > 0.
Lemma 23 states that ψ(l) is a function deﬁned on LA.
42C.3 Extension of ψ to [0,1]
Lemma 24 ψ : LA → R++ is (i) continuous, and (ii) increasing.
Proof. (i) For all l such that (l,w) ∈ A for some w, we will show that ψ is continuous
at l. There exist µ,η such that {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}, l = v(η) and w = v(η) − v(µ). By
Continuity, there exists an open neighborhood B(η) of η such that {µ}   {µ,η0}   {η0}
for all η0 ∈ B(η).
We ﬁrst show that if l < max∆ v, ψ is continuous at l. Since 0 < l < max∆ v, Continuity
implies that there exist ηi ∈ B(η), i = 1,2, such that l1 ≡ v(η1) < l < v(η2) ≡ l2. Let


















η2 if l ≤ ln < l2.
Since ln → l, we have ηn → η. Especially, ηn ∈ B(η) for all suﬃciently large n, and,
hence, {µ}   {µ,ηn}   {ηn}. Moreover, since v is mixture linear, ln = v(ηn). Let





n) = u(µ) − W({µ,η
n}).











If l = max∆ v, apply the above argument with assuming l = l2.
(ii) Take (l,w),(l0,w0) ∈ A s.t.l > l0. Let these correspond to µ,η and µ0,η0. We
have v(η) = l > l0 = v(η0). By Lemma 13 (ii), {µαη0}   {µαη0,ηαη0}   {ηαη0}. Hence,
by Lemma 23, u(µαη0) − W({µαη0,ηαη0}) = ψ(lαl0) · αw. Moreover, by Lemma 13 (i),
{µαη0,ηαη0} % {eµηαη0}, and, hence,
u(µαη
0) − ψ(lαl
0) · αw ≥ α[u(µ) − ψ(l) · w] + (1 − α)u(η
0).
Thus, we have ψ(lαl0) ≤ ψ(l). Since ψ is continuous, ψ(l0) ≤ ψ(l) as α → 0.
Let l = supLA. Deﬁne ψ(0) ≡ inf{ψ(l)|l ∈ LA} and ψ(l) ≡ sup{ψ(l)|l ∈ LA}. By
Lemma 24, ψ : [0,l] → R+ is a unique continuous increasing extension.
Lemma 25 Let {µ}   {µ,η} ∼ {η}. If (v(η),v(η) − v(µ)) ∈ A, then u(η) ≥ u(µ) −
ϕ(v(η),v(η) − v(µ)).
Proof. There exist µ0,η0 such that {µ0}   {µ0,η0}   {η0}, v(η0) = v(η), and v(η0)−v(µ0) =
v(η) − v(µ). Since ϕ(v(η),v(η) − v(µ)) = ϕ(v(η0),v(η0) − v(µ0)) = u(µ0) − W({µ0,η0}), it
suﬃces to show that u(µ0) − W({µ0,η0}) ≥ u(µ) − u(η).
43We will claim that u(µ0)−u(η0) > u(µ)−u(η). Suppose otherwise, that is, u(µ)−u(η) ≥
u(µ0) − u(η0). Let
E ≡ {α ∈ [0,1]|{µαµ
0}   {µαµ
0,ηαη
0}   {ηαη
0}}.
By assumption, 0 ∈ E and 1 / ∈ E. Moreover, by Continuity, E is open in [0,1]. Let
¯ α ≡ supE ∈ (0,1]. By Continuity, ¯ α / ∈ E, and hence
{µ¯ αµ
0}   {µ¯ αµ
0,η¯ αη
0} ∼ {η¯ αη
0}. (17)
Since u(µ)−u(η) ≥ u(µ0)−u(η0) > ϕ(v(η0),v(η0)−v(µ0)), v(η) = v(η0), and v(η0)−v(µ0) =







for all α ∈ [0,1]. On the other hand, since ¯ α is a supremum of E, there exists a sequence



















From Continuity and (18),
u(µ¯ αµ
0) − u(η¯ αη
0) > u(µ¯ αµ
0) − W({µ¯ αµ
0,η¯ αη
0}),
that is, W({µ¯ αµ0,η¯ αη0}) > u(η¯ αη0), which contradicts (17).
Since v(η0) − v(µ0) = v(ηαη0) − v(µαµ0) for all α ∈ E, by Lemma 22 (i), u(µ0) −







0) − W({µ¯ αµ
0,η¯ αη
0}) = u(µ¯ αµ
0) − u(η¯ αη
0)
= ¯ α(u(µ) − u(η)) + (1 − ¯ α)(u(µ
0) − u(η
0)) ≥ u(µ) − u(η),
as desired.
Let
B ≡ {(l,w) ∈ [0,1]
2 |l = v(η), w = v(η) − v(µ) for some {µ}   {µ,η}},
LB ≡ {l ∈ [0,1]|(l,w) ∈ B for some w},
B(l) ≡ {w ∈ [0,1]|(l,w) ∈ B}.
Lemma 26 (i) B is convex.
(ii) If (l,w) ∈ B, (αl + (1 − α)l0,αw) ∈ B for all l0 ∈ [0,1] and α ∈ (0,1).
(iii) LB is a non-degenerate interval satisfying inf LB = 0 and supLB = 1.
(iv) For all l ∈ LB, B(l) is an interval satisfying inf B(l) = 0.
44Proof. (i) Take (li,wi) ∈ B, i = 1,2 and α ∈ [0,1]. There exist µi,ηi such that {µi}  
{µi,ηi}, li = v(ηi), and wi = v(ηi)−v(µi). Since we have v(ηi) > v(µi) and u(µi) > u(ηi) for
i = 1,2, mixture linearity of u and v implies u(µ1αµ2) > u(η1αη2) and v(η1αη2) > v(µ1αµ2),
and hence {µ1αµ2}   {µ1αµ2,η1αη2}. Therefore, α(l1,w1) + (1 − α)(l2,w2) ∈ B.
(ii) Take any (l,w) ∈ B. There exist µ,η such that {µ}   {µ,η}, l = v(η) and w =
v(η) − v(µ). For all ν with v(ν) = l0, by Temptation Independence, {µαν}   {µαν,ηαν}
for all α ∈ (0,1). Hence, (αl + (1 − α)l0,αw) = (v(ηαν),v(ηαν) − v(µαν)) ∈ B.
(iii) Take any l ∈ LB. By part (ii), αl ∈ LB and αl + (1 − α) ∈ LB for all α ∈ (0,1) as
desired.
(iv) Take w ∈ B(l). By letting l0 = l, part (ii) implies (l,αw) ∈ B for all α ∈ (0,1).
That is, αw ∈ B(l).
Deﬁne F : B → R+ by
F(l,w) ≡ sup{u(µ) − u(η)|l = v(η), w = v(η) − v(µ) for some {µ}   {µ,η}}.
Lemma 27 F is weakly concave.
Proof. Take (li,wi) ∈ B, i = 1,2, and α ∈ (0,1). There exist µn
i ,ηn
i such that {µn
i }  
{µn
i ,ηn
i } , li = v(ηn
i ), wi = v(ηn
i )−v(µn
i ), and, u(µn
i )−u(ηn
i ) → F(wi). Since v(ηn
i ) > v(µn
i )
and u(µn
i ) > u(ηn















2}. Since αl1 + (1 − α)l2 = v(ηn
1αηn

























= αF(l1,w1) + (1 − α)F(l2,w2).
By Theorem 10.3 [31, p.85], F(l,·) : B(l) → R+ can be uniquely extended to the closure
of B(l) in a continuous and concave way.
By Lemma 26 (iii), inf LB = 0 and supLB = 1. Take any (l,w) ∈ B. By Lemma 26 (ii),
the interior of the convex hull of {(0,0),(0,1),(l,w)} is a subset of B. Since this convex
set is polyhedral, Theorem 10.3 [31, p.85] ensures that F can be uniquely extended to its
closure in a continuous and concave way. Hence, for all l ∈ LB, F(l,0) is deﬁned by this
extension and F(·,0) is continuous and concave.
Denote supA(l) = wl. Notice that wl ≤ l. Since A(l) ⊂ B(l), wl ≤ supB(l).
Lemma 28 Take all l ∈ LA.
(i) F(l,w) > ψ(l)w for all w ∈ A(l).
(ii) If wl / ∈ A(l), F(l,wl) = ψ(l)wl.
45Proof. (i) Since (l,w) ∈ A, there exist µ,η such that {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}, l = v(η), and
w = v(η) − v(µ). Then,
F(l,w) ≥ u(µ) − u(η) > u(µ) − W({µ,η}) = ψ(l)w.
(ii) Since F(l,·) : B(l) → R+ is continuous, part (i) implies F(l,wl) ≥ ψ(l)wl. By
contradiction, suppose F(l,wl) > ψ(l)wl = sup{ϕ(l,w)|w ∈ A(l)}. By Lemma 25, for all
w ∈ A(l) and µ,η such that l = v(η), w = v(η) − v(µ) and {µ}   {µ,η} ∼ {η}, we
have ϕ(l,w) ≥ u(µ) − u(η). Thus there exist sequences wn → w, {µn}1
n=1 and {ηn}1
n=1
such that wn = v(bn) − v(an) ∈ A(l), {µn}   {µn,ηn}   {ηn}, and u(µn) − u(ηn) > c >
sup{ϕ(l,w)|w ∈ A(l)}, where c > 0 is a constant number. Since {µn}1
n=1 and {ηn}1
n=1 are
sequences in ∆, we can assume µn → µ0 and ηn → η0 without loss of generality. Since
u(µ
n) − u(η







continuity implies u(µ0) − u(η0) > u(µ0) − W({µ0,η0}), that is, W({µ0,η0}) > u(η0). On
the other hand, since wl = v(η0) − v(µ0) > 0 and u(µ0) > u(η0), we have {µ0}   {µ0,η0}.
Hence {µ0}   {µ0,η0}   {η0}, which contradicts wl / ∈ A(l).
Lemma 29 Let l ∈ LB.
(i) F(l,0) > 0 if and only if there exist µ,η such that u(µ) > u(η) and v(µ) = v(η) = l.
(ii) If F(l,0) > 0, then l ∈ LA.
(iii) If F(l,0) > 0, then F(l0,0) > 0 for all l0 ∈ (0,1).
Proof. (i) First suppose F(l,0) > 0. By deﬁnition, there exists a sequence wn ∈ B(l) such
that wn → 0 and F(l,wn) > c > 0 for some c. Let {µn},{ηn} be corresponding sequences
that satisfy {µn}   {µn,ηn}, v(ηn) = l, wn = v(ηn) − v(µn), and u(µn) − u(ηn) > c. Since
{µn} and {ηn} are sequences in ∆, without loss of generality, assume that µn → µ and
ηn → η for some µ,η. Since wn → 0, v(µ) = v(η). Moreover, u(µ) − u(η) ≥ c > 0.
Next suppose that u(µ) > u(η) and v(µ) = v(η) = l. Let ν+ and ν¡ be a maximal
and a minimal lottery with respect to v. For all suﬃciently large n, u(ν¡ 1
nµ) > u(ν+ 1
nη)
and v(ν+ 1
nη) > v(ν¡ 1
nµ). Since {ν¡ 1
nµ}   {ν¡ 1
nµ,ν+ 1











+αη) = u(µ) − u(η) > 0.
(ii) By part (i), there exist µ,η such that u(µ) > u(η) and v(µ) = v(η) = l. By Set
Betweenness, {µ} % {µ,η} % {η}. If {µ}   {µ,η}, we have v(η) > v(µ), which is a
contradiction. Hence, we have {µ} ∼ {µ,η}   {η}. Let ν¡ be a minimal lottery with
respect to v. Since v(η) = v(µ) = l > 0 = v(ν¡), for all small α, u(ν¡αµ) > u(η) and
v(η) > v(ν¡αµ), and hence, {ν¡αµ}   {ν¡αµ,η}. Moreover, by Continuity, for all small
α, {ν¡αµ,η}   {η}. Hence, by deﬁnition, l ∈ LA.
(iii) By contradiction, suppose F(l0,0) = 0 for some l0 ∈ (0,1). Assume l < l0. There
exists l00 ∈ (0,1) with l0 < l00. Then, l0 can be written as a convex combination between l
46and l00, denoted by αl + (1 − α)l00. Moreover, since LB is an interval with inf LB = 0 and
supLB = 1, l00 ∈ LB. Since F(·,0) is concave and F(·,0) ≥ 0,
F(l
0,0) = F(αl + (1 − α)l
00,0) ≥ αF(l,0) + (1 − α)F(l
00,0) > 0,
which is a contradiction. The same argument can be applied when l0 < l.
Lemma 30 Let l ∈ LB.
(i) If F(l,0) = 0, F(l,w) = u(µ) − u(η) for all µ,η such that {µ}   {µ,η}, l = v(η),
and w = v(η) − v(µ).
(ii) If F(l,0) = 0, F(l,·) : B(l) → R+ is linear.
Proof. (i) Take all µ,µ0,η,η0 such that {µ}   {µ,η}, {µ0}   {µ0,η0}, l = v(η) = v(η0) and
w = v(η) − v(µ) = v(η0) − v(µ0). Notice that v(µ) = v(µ0). By Lemma 29 (i) and (iii),
since v(η) = v(η0), we must have u(η) = u(η0). Similarly, since v(µ) = v(µ0), we must have
u(µ) = u(µ0). Hence, u(µ)−u(η) = u(µ0)−u(η0). Therefore, we have F(l,w) = u(µ)−u(η).
(ii) Since F(l,0) = 0, it is enough to show that F(l,·) is mixture linear on B(l), that
is, F(l,αw1 +(1−α)w2) = αF(l,w1)+(1−α)F(l,w2) for all w1,w2 ∈ B(l) and α ∈ (0,1).
There exist µi,ηi, i = 1,2, such that {µi}   {µi,ηi}, l = v(ηi) and wi = v(ηi)−v(µi). Since
{µ1αµ2}   {µ1αµ2,η1αη2}, part (i) implies that
F(l,αw1 + (1 − α)w2) = u(µ1αµ2) − u(η1αη2) = αF(l,w1) + (1 − α)F(l,w2).
Lemma 31 Let l ≡ supLA. If l / ∈ LA and l ∈ LB, then ψ(l)w ≥ F(l,w) for all w ∈ B(l).
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that ψ(l)w0 < F(l,w0) for some w0 ∈ B(l). By Lemma 29
(ii), we must have F(l,0) = 0. By Lemma 30 (ii), F(l,·) is linear. Thus, ψ(l)w < F(l,w)
for all w ∈ B(l).
Take an increasing sequence ln → l. Notice that ln ∈ LA. For all l ∈ LA, denote
w(l) ≡ supA(l). If w(ln) ∈ A(ln), by Lemma 16 (v), w(ln) = ln. If w(ln) / ∈ A(ln), by
Lemma 28 (ii), w(ln) is a unique number satisfying F(ln,w(ln)) = ψ(ln)w(ln). Since the
sequence {w(ln)}1
n=1 belongs to [0,1], there exists a subsequence {w(lm)}1
m=1 converging to
some point w¤ ∈ [0,1].
Case 1: w¤ > 0. Take any w ∈ (0,w¤). Since w(lm) → w¤, w < w(lm) for all
suﬃciently large m. Since w < w¤ ≤ supB(l), (l,w) ∈ B. Hence, there exist µ,η such that
{µ}   {µ,η}, l = v(η), and w = v(η) − v(µ). Let αm ≡ lm
l ∈ (0,1). Let µm ≡ µαmν¡
and ηm ≡ ηαmν¡, where ν¡ is a minimal lottery with respect to v. Then, lm = v(ηm)
and wm ≡ v(ηm) − v(µm) = αmw < w¤ < w(lm). That is, (lm,wm) ∈ A. Moreover, by
Temptation Independence, {µm}   {µm,ηm}. By Set Betweenness, {µm}   {µm,ηm} %
{ηm} for all m.
Consider the following two sub-cases:
47(a) For inﬁnitely many m, {µm}   {µm,ηm}   {ηm}. Then, for all such m, ψ(lm)wm =
u(µm) − W({µm,ηm}). By passing through a corresponding subsequence, ψ(l)w = u(µ) −
W({µ,η}). On the other hand, by assumption, ψ(l)w < u(µ) − u(η). Hence, we have
{µ}   {µ,η}   {η}, which contradicts l / ∈ LA.
(b) For all suﬃciently large m, {µm}   {µm,ηm} ∼ {ηm}. Since (lm,wm) ∈ A, by
Lemma 25, we have ψ(lm)wm ≥ u(µm) − u(ηm). Hence, ψ(l)w ≥ u(µ) − u(η) as m → ∞.
Moreover, by Lemma 30 (i), u(µ) − u(η) = F(l,w). Hence, ψ(l)w ≥ F(l,w), which is a
contradiction.
Case 2: w¤ = 0. Take any w ∈ B(l). Since w > 0 and w(lm) → 0, w(lm) < w
for all suﬃciently large m. Let µm,ηm be the sequence constructed as in Case 1. Since
wm ≡ v(ηm)−v(µm) → w and w(lm) → 0, we have w(lm) < wm for all suﬃciently large m.
Since F(lm,·) is concave, by Lemma 28 (ii), ψ(lm)wm ≥ F(lm,wm). Thus, ψ(l)w ≥ F(l,w)
as m → ∞. This is a contradiction.
If l ≡ supLA = 1, ψ : [0,1] → R+ has been already deﬁned. If l < 1, we must have
F(l,0) = 0 because of Lemma 29 (ii). Moreover, in this case, by Lemma 29 (iii), F(l,0) = 0
for all l ∈ (0,1). Moreover, by Lemma 30 (ii), F(l,·) : B(l) → R+ is a linear function. Let
f(l) > 0 be its slope, that is, F(l,w) = f(l)w. Since F is concave, so is f : (0,1) → R++.
By Theorem 10.3 [31, p.85], f admits a unique continuous concave extension to [0,1].
Abusing notation, denote this extension by f. By Lemma 31, f(l)w = F(l,w) ≤ ψ(l)w,
that is, ψ(l) ≥ f(l). Take any continuous increasing function g : [l,1] → R+ such that
g(l) = ψ(l) and g(l) ≥ f(l) for all l ∈ [l,1]. Now deﬁne ψ : [0,1] → R+ by
ψ(l) ≡
{
ψ(l) if l ∈ [0,l],
g(l) if l ∈ (l,1].
By construction, ψ is a continuous increasing extension of ψ to [0,1].
C.4 Establishing the Representation
Lemma 32 If {µ}   {µ,η} ∼ {η}, then ψ(v(η))(v(η) − v(µ)) ≥ u(µ) − u(η).
Proof. Denote l = v(η) and w = v(η) − v(µ). By assumption, l ∈ LB. Let l ≡ supLA.
Case 0: If l ∈ LA and w ∈ A(l), by Lemma 25, ψ(l)w = ψ(l)w ≥ u(µ)−u(η) as desired.
Case 1: l ∈ (0,l). We have l ∈ LA. If wl ∈ A(l), we have wl = l, and, hence,
w ∈ A(l) = (0,l]. Hence, Case 0 can be applied. If wl / ∈ A(l), by Lemma 28 (ii), we have
ψ(l)w = ψ(l)w ≥ u(µ) − u(η).
Case 2: l = l. If l ∈ LA, LA is not an open interval. Thus we must have l = 1. That is,
LA = (0,1]. The same argument as in Case 1 can be applied. If l / ∈ LA, by Lemma 31, we
have ψ(l)w = ψ(l)w ≥ u(µ) − u(η).
Case 3: l ∈ (l,1]. By construction, we have ψ(l)w ≥ f(l)w = F(l,w) = u(µ) − u(η) as
desired.















Proof. Without loss of generality, assume {µ} % {η}. By Set Betweenness, {µ} % {µ,η} %
{η}. There are four cases:
Case (i): {µ}   {µ,η}   {η}. In this case, v(η) > v(µ). By deﬁnition of ϕ and
Lemma 23,
W({µ,η}) = u(µ) − ϕ(v(η),v(η) − v(µ))
= u(µ) − ψ(v(η))(v(η) − v(µ)) > u(η).
Thus W({µ,η}) can be expressed as the desired form.
Case (ii): {µ}   {µ,η} ∼ {η}. We have v(η) > v(µ). By Lemma 32,
W({µ,η}) = u(η) ≥ u(µ) − ψ(v(η))(v(η) − v(µ)),
as desired.
Case (iii): {µ} ∼ {µ,η}   {η}. By construction of v, v(µ) ≥ v(η). Since ψ(v(µ))(v(µ)−
v(η)) ≥ 0, we have
W({µ,η}) = u(µ) > u(η) − ψ(v(µ))(v(µ) − v(η)).
Thus, W({µ,η}) is represented by the desired form.
Case (iv): {µ} ∼ {µ,η} ∼ {η}. If v(η) ≥ v(µ), W({µ,η}) = u(η) ≥ u(µ) −
ψ(v(η))(v(η) − v(µ)). If v(µ) ≥ v(η), we have W({µ,η}) = u(µ) ≥ u(η) − ψ(v(µ))(v(µ) −
v(η)). In either case, W({µ,η}) is represented by the desired form.


















Since ψ is continuous and weakly increasing, c(µ,·) is weakly increasing for all µ and c is
continuous. Since % satisﬁes Set Betweenness, by Lemma 5 of Noor and Takeoka [30], the
























Finally, by Continuity and Lemma 6 of Noor and Takeoka [30], the representation can be
extended to Z as desired.
49D Appendix: Proof of Theorem 5
Since u and u0 represent the same commitment preference, they must be ordinally equiva-
lent. Moreover, since both are also linear and continuous, there exist constants αu > 0 and
βu such that u0 = αuu + βu.
In case of temptation utility functions, Theorem 2 ensures that there exist constants
αv > 0 and βv such that v0 = αvv + βv.
Let W : Z → R and W 0 : Z → R be the representations associated with (u,v,ψ) and
(u0,v0,ψ0), respectively. Now we show that following lemma:
Lemma 34 For all x, W 0(x) = αuW(x) + βu.
Proof. As shown in Lemma 11 (ii), there exists a unique function α : Z → [0,1] such that
x ∼ {µ∆α(x)µ∆} for all x,where µ∆ and µ∆ are respectively the best and worst lotteries





∆α(x)µ∆) + βu = αuW(x) + βu,
as was to be shown.
Now take any l ∈ L. By deﬁnition, there exists µ,η such that v(η) = l and {µ}  
{µ,η}   {η}. By Lemma 34 and the representations,
W






0(µ)) = αu(u(µ) − ψ(v(η))(v(η) − v(µ))) + βu
⇒ αuu(µ) + βu − αvψ
0(αvl + βv)(v(η) − v(µ)) = αu(u(µ) − ψ(v(η))(v(η) − v(µ))) + βu.
Thus, we have ψ0(αvl + βv) = αu
αvψ(l) as desired.
E Appendix: Proof of Corollary 2
Deﬁne W : Z → R+, u,v : ∆ → [0,1] and ψ : LA → R++ as in the proof of Theorem 4.
First we show that ψ is strictly increasing on LA. Take any l,l0 ∈ LA with l0 < l. We
want to show that ψ(l0) < ψ(l). By deﬁnition, there exist µ,η such that l = v(η) and
{µ}   {µ,η}   {η}. By the additional axiom, {µ,ηαµ}   {eµηαµ}. Moreover, since
v(µ) < v(η), Lemma 13 (ii) implies that {µ}   {µ,ηαµ}   {ηαµ}. By deﬁnition of ψ,
u(µ) − ψ(v(ηαµ))(v(ηαµ) − v(µ))
= W({µ,ηαµ}) > u(eµηαµ)
= α(u(µ) − ψ(v(η))(v(η) − v(µ))) + (1 − α)u(µ).
Hence, we have ψ(v(η)) > ψ(v(ηαµ)). For some α suﬃciently close to one, we have
l0 < v(ηαµ) < v(η) = l. Since ψ is weakly increasing, ψ(l0) ≤ ψ(v(ηαµ)) < ψ(l) as
desired.
50As shown in the proof of Theorem 4, we can take any strictly increasing function
g : [l,1] → R+ such that g(l) = ψ(l) and g(l) ≥ f(l) for all l ∈ [l,1]. Deﬁne the strictly
increasing function ψ : [0,1] → R++ as ψ = ψ on [0,l] and ψ = g on (l,1]. By Lemmas 32,
33 and the subsequent argument, the component (u,v,ψ) is a TDSC representation of %.
F Appendix: Proof of Corollary 3
Deﬁne u,v : ∆ → [0,1] and ψ : LA → R++ as in the proof of Theorem 4. By the same
argument as in Lemma 24 (ii) together with assuming {µ,η}α{η0} ∼ {eµη}α{η0}, we can
show the next lemma. A proof is omitted.
Lemma 35 ψ : LA → R++ is constant, that is, for all l,l0 ∈ LA, ψ(l) = ψ(l0).
Recall the function F : B → R+, deﬁned as in the proof of Theorem 4. Let l ≡ supLA.
By abusing notation, let ψ be a unique constant extension of ψ to [0,l]. Deﬁne ψ : [0,1] →
R++ as a unique extension of ψ that is constant on [0,1]. If l = 1, ψ = ψ : [0,1] → R++.
If l < 1, we must have F(l,0) = 0 because of Lemma 29 (ii). Moreover, in this case, by
Lemma 29 (iii), F(l,0) = 0 for all l ∈ (0,1). Moreover, by Lemma 30 (ii), F(l,·) : B(l) →
R+ is a linear function. Let f(l) > 0 be its slope, that is, F(l,w) = f(l)w. Since F is
concave, so is f : (0,1) → R++. By Theorem 10.3 [31, p.85], f admits a unique continuous
concave extension to [0,1]. Abusing notation, denote this extension by f. By Lemma 31,
f(l)w = F(l,w) ≤ ψw, that is, ψ ≥ f(l). By Lemma 28 (i), f(l) > ψ for all l < l. Since
f is concave, we must have ψ ≥ f(l) for all l ∈ (l,1]. That is, this constant function
ψ : [0,1] → R++ satisﬁes
ψ
{
= ψ if w ∈ [0,l],
≥ f(l) if w ∈ (l,1].
By Lemmas 32, 33 and the subsequent argument, the components (u,v,ψ) is a TDSC
representation of %.
G Appendix: Proof of Theorem 6
G.1 Suﬃciency
By hypothesis, % admits a strict TDSC representation (u,v,ψ). We show that C must
have the desired representation. To ease notation, let wx(µ) := u(µ) − c(µ,maxx v) :=
u(µ) − ψ(maxx v)(maxx v − v(µ)).
Lemma 36 If µ ∈ argmaxfµ,ηg wfµ,ηg and η ∈ argmaxfµ,ηg v then µ ∈ C({µ,η}).
Proof. First we show that {η}   {µ} is not possible. Consider two cases: If {η} %
{µ,η}   {µ}, then the representation implies u(η) − c(η,η) > u(µ) ≥ u(µ) − c(µ,η),
51contradicting the deﬁnition of µ. If {η}   {η,µ} ∼ {µ}, but then the representation
implies η  ∈ argmaxfµ,ηg v, contradicting the deﬁnition of η. Conclude that {µ} % {η}
must hold.
Assume {µ}   {η}. First of all, if v(η) = v(µ), the representation implies {µ} ∼
{µ,η}   {η}, and hence, by Sophistication, µ ∈ C({µ,η}), as desired. From now on,
assume v(η) > v(µ). Since µ ∈ argmaxfµ,ηg wfµ,ηg, for all α ∈ (0,1),
u(µ) − ψ(v(ηαµ))(v(ηαµ) − v(µ))
= α(u(µ) − ψ(v(ηαµ))(v(η) − v(µ))) + (1 − α)u(µ)
> α(u(µ) − ψ(v(η))(v(η) − v(µ))) + (1 − α)u(µ)
≥ αu(η) + (1 − α)u(µ) = u(ηαµ),
and thus, the representation implies {µ,ηαµ}   {ηαµ}, and Sophistication in turn yields
µ ∈ C({µ,ηαµ}). By upper hemicontinuity of C, µ ∈ C({µ,η}) as α → 1.
If {µ} ∼ {η}, then together with v(η) ≥ v(µ) it must be that u(η) ≥ u(µ) − c(µ,η).
However, by deﬁnition of µ the reverse inequality also holds, and thus u(η) = u(µ) −
c(µ,v(η)). This in turn implies that c(µ,v(η)) = 0 and so v(η) = v(µ). Consider the
lotteries µ0,η0 s.t. {µ0} ∼ {µ0,η0}   {η0} guaranteed by nondegeneracy¤. Then {µαµ0} ∼
{µαµ0,ηαη0}   {ηαη0} for all α, and by Sophistication, C({µαµ0,ηαη0}) = {µαµ0} for all
α. By upper hemicontinuity of C, µ ∈ C({µ,η}), as desired.
Lemma 37 Result.
Proof. Take any nonsingleton menu x.
Step 1: Show argmaxx wx ⊂ C(x).
Let µ ∈ argmaxx wx. Take any ν ∈ C(x) and η ∈ argmaxx v. By the previous lemma,
µ ∈ C({µ,η}). Given that wfµ,ν,ηg(ν) = wx(ν) ≤ wx(µ) = wfµ,ν,ηg(µ) and v(η) ≥ v(ν), the
representation implies
{µ,η} ∼ {µ,ν,η} ∼ x.
Observe that {µ,η} temptation-dominates ν: Since η ∈ argmaxx v, {η}   {ν,η} is
ruled out. If {ν,η}   {ν}, then we have {η} ∼ {ν,η}   {ν} and so η weakly tempts ν.
The remaining case is where {ν} % {ν,η} % {η}. Here for all α ∈ (0,1),
{ναµ
¤}   {ναµ
¤,ηαη
¤}.
In particular, η is temptation-ranked weakly higher than ν. Thus {µ,η} temptation-
dominates ν.
Thus, by Sophistication, {µ,ν,η} ∼ {µ,η} implies C({µ,ν,η})  = {ν}. If µ ∈ C({µ,ν,η}).
Then given that {µ,ν,η} ∼ x and ν ∈ C(x), Weak WARP implies that µ ∈ C(x), as desired.
If on the other hand η ∈ C({µ,ν,η}), then a similar argument yields η ∈ C(x). However,
given we established at the start of the proof that µ ∈ C({µ,η}), Weak WARP therefore
implies µ ∈ C(x), as desired.
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Let ν ∈ C(x). Take any µ ∈ argmaxx wx and η ∈ argmaxx v. Then by the representa-
tion
x ∼ {µ,η} ∼ {µ,ν,η}.
Since clearly µ ∈ argmaxfµ,ν,ηg wfµ,ν,ηg, Step 1 implies that µ ∈ C({µ,ν,η}). By Weak
WARP, ν ∈ C({µ,ν,η}) also holds. Therefore C({µ,ν,η})  = {µ}, and so Sophistication
implies {ν,η} % {µ,ν,η}. Also, since µ ∈ argmaxfµ,ν,ηg wfµ,ν,ηg, the representation implies
{µ,ν,η} % {ν,η}. Therefore, we have determined that
{µ,ν,η} ∼ {ν,η},
and µ,ν ∈ C({µ,ν,η}). Note that by transitivity, x ∼ {ν,η}, and so Weak WARP also
implies ν ∈ C({ν,η}).
Next we show that W({ν,η}) = u(ν) − c(ν,η). Consider four cases:
1. {η}   {ν} : Then v(η) ≥ v(ν) and the representation implies {η} ∼ {η,ν}   {ν},
which by Sophistication implies ν  ∈ C({ν,η}), a contradiction.
2. {ν} % {ν,η}   {η}: Then the representation implies W({ν,η}) = u(ν) − c(ν,η).
3. {ν}   {ν,η} ∼ {η}: Then by Sophistication, η ∈ C({ν,η}), and we also know
from before that ν ∈ C({ν,η}). Therefore we have {ν}   {ν,η} and C({ν,η}) = {ν,η}.
By ex post Decreasing Self-Control, C({ν,ναη}) = {ν} for all α ∈ (0,1), which by So-
phistication implies {ν,ναη}   {ναη}. By the representation, we therefore see that
W({ν,ναη}) = u(ν) − c(ν,ναη) for all α, and thus by continuity of the representation,
we see that W({ν,η}) = u(ν) − c(ν,η).
4. {ν} ∼ {ν,η} ∼ {η}: Then by nondegeneracy¤ there are µ¤,η¤ s.t. {ναµ¤}  
{ναµ¤,ηαη¤} % {ηαη¤} for all α. As in the previous cases, it follows that W({ναµ¤,ηαη¤}) =
u(ναµ¤)−c(ναµ¤,ηαη¤) for all α and thus by continuity of the representation, W({ν,η}) =
u(ν) − c(ν,η).
This establishes that W({ν,η}) = u(ν)−c(ν,v(η)). To conclude the proof, observe that
by the representation, {µ,ν,η} ∼ {ν,η} implies
u(µ) − c(µ,v(η)) = u(ν) − c(ν,v(η)).
Since, µ ∈ argmaxx wx it follows that ν ∈ argmaxx wx, as desired.
G.2 Necessity
Lemma 38 Weak WARP is necessary.
Proof. Suppose µ,η ∈ x ∩ y, x ∼ y, µ ∈ C(x) and η ∈ C(y) but µ  ∈ C(y). Then
u(µ) − c(µ,max
x v) = W(x) = W(y) = u(η) − c(η,max
y v) > u(µ) − c(µ,max
y v),
and in particular, c(µ,maxx v) < c(µ,maxy v) and maxx v < maxy v. Then
u(η) − c(η,max
x v) > u(η) − c(η,max
y v) = u(µ) − c(µ,max
x v),
53where the equality is observed earlier. But then it must be that µ  ∈ C(x), a contradiction.
Lemma 39 Sophistication is necessary.
Proof. For any ν ∈ x,
W(x) ≥ u(ν) − c(ν,max
x v) ≥ u(ν) − c(ν, max
x[fµg
v).
Therefore, W(x∪{µ}) > W(x) ≥ u(ν)−c(ν,maxx[fµg v) for all ν ∈ x, from which it follows
that the choice from x ∪ {µ} cannot be in x. Thus, C(x ∪ {µ}) = {µ}. For the converse,
suppose C(x ∪ {µ}) = {µ}. Since v(µ) ≤ v(η), we have that for all ν ∈ x
W(x ∪ {µ}) = u(µ) − c(µ, max
x[fµg
v) > u(ν) − c(ν, max
x[fµg
v) = u(ν) − c(ν,max
x v),
and in particular, W(x ∪ {µ}) > W(x), as desired.
Lemma 40 ex post Decreasing Self-Control is necessary.
Proof. Suppose {µ}   {µ,η}. Since µ ∈ C({µ,η}), u(µ) − ψ(v(η))(v(η) − v(µ)) ≥ u(η).
Mixing both sides of the equality with u(µ) yields
u(ηαµ)
≤ α[u(µ) − ψ(v(η))(v(η) − v(µ))] + (1 − α)u(µ)
= u(µ) − αψ(v(η))(v(η) − v(µ))
= u(µ) − ψ(v(η))(v(ηαµ) − v(µ))
< u(µ) − ψ(v(ηαµ))(v(ηαµ) − v(µ)). Thus C({µ,µαη}) = {µ} for all α ∈ (0,1).
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